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Introduction 
6
Power is a fascinating phenomenon. While this is something different than money, 
somehow I always had the feeling that Economic sciences could provide useful tools to 
facilitate its understanding. In what follows, I tried to provide some – necessarily modest 
– contributions to its analysis, focusing mainly on how the delegation of decision-making 
often required by the complexity of our societies can make the true distribution of power 
differ from the apparent one. 
In the first chapter (“Discretionary Power in Mission Setting as a Preference for 
Flexibility”) I am trying to understand why public institutions or government agencies 
very often end up being given some large room of maneuver regarding the definition of 
the missions that they will carry out on behalf of their constituencies – something we can 
realize by noticing how many institutions are typically doing things which have nothing 
to do anymore with the reasons for which they were set up. The reason I am providing is 
an intuitive one – yet, to my knowledge, new: in an uncertain world, institutions 
sometimes need to be given some flexibility in their mission setting to be able to adjust to 
circumstances as they arise. Institutions being run by individuals with private agenda, one 
should however be mindful that conflict of interests may arise, thereby requiring some 
balance between a too large and a too restrictive mandate.  
The second chapter (“Generating functions for coalitional power indices: an application 
to the IMF”), a result of a collaboration with José-Maria Alonso-Meijide, is focused on a 
similar kind of delegation problem, but restricted to cases where the delegation has to 
comply with some voting scheme, like in a democratic assemble for instance. Here, the 
power merely lies in the hand of the one who is able to exert an influence over the final 
outcome. In cooperative game theory, this one is called “the pivotal player”, because 
he/she is able to turn a losing coalition into a winning one. Some tools are already 
existing to address the issue in some specific cases, like the Electoral College in the 
United States, or the Security Council at the United Nations. But no tools were easily 
available to tackle the issue for one of the most important financial institution, namely the 
International Monetary Fund. The large number of players involved – 184 members 
states – made it more suitable for the decision process to have a two-step voting scheme, 
where each of the individual countries has to delegate its power to a group of countries 
(the so-called “Constituencies”, technically referred to as “a priori unions” in the chapter) 
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represented by one of the 25 Executive Directors in the IMF Executive Board. The 
contribution of the chapter is to provide “ready-to-apply” methods allowing the 
computation of the so-called “power index” of players, that is: a quantified measure of 
how much power each of them will have in the decision-making process. Some computer 
science related results have been needed as intermediary steps, which are presented as an 
appendix to the chapter.2 
Drawing on this methodology, the third chapter (“Should European Union represent 
European States at the IMF?”), also the result of a collaboration, this time with Agnès 
Benassy-Quéré, investigates what kind of delegation could best serve the power of the 
European Union within the International Monetary Fund. The issue there is not anymore 
theoretical, as it has been under intense discussions within and outside the EU over now 
many years. While the intention behind the creation of a single EU seat at the IMF is to 
increase the EU influence in this institution, our analysis suggests such a step would 
rather reduce it in most scenarios looked at. Intuitively, being united here does not help to 
be stronger, as the current spreading of EU members across many constituencies helps 
getting leverage in each of them.3 
                                                 
2 The respective contributions of the authors to this paper are as follows: my co-author found the generating 
function and its proof, while I found the application domain (IMF), wrote the algorithms to compute the 
indices, provided the proof of their complexity, made the computations of all indices and drafted the paper. 
3 The respective contributions of the authors to this paper are as follows: I computed the IMF quotas under 
all the different scenario (reintegrating intra-EU trade and financial flows), I identified the power indices 
approach best fit to the situation and I carried out the computation of the various power indices under the 
different scenarii, while my co-author acted as the main drafter of the paper presenting the results. Both of 
us reflected and carried out a set of interviews with Finance Minister Officials in order to understand which 
methodology could best fit our initial intention to assess the impact that a EU single seat at the IMF.  
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Chapter 1. 
Discretionary power in mission setting 
as a preference for flexibility 
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Discretionary Mission Setting as a Preference for Flexibility 
Carlos Bowlesy
September 2014
Abstract
The mandate of government agencies is often leaving a substantial room of maneuver for them to
decide the specic tasks they will carry out on behalf of their constituency, in order to allow them
to adjust to new situations as they arise. In order to formalize this intuition, I extend Aghion and
Tirole (1997)s model of formal and real authority to a situation where the principal has state-dependent
preferences, thereby leaving scope for exhibiting a preference for Flexibility à la Kreps (1979). I show
that the principal can either decide to give a large or a restricted mandate to her agency, depending
on the extent to which they share the same interests and the level of the monitoring costs. When the
congruence of interests is high and the monitoring costs are low, exibility is preferred.
I am extremely grateful to Karl Schlag for his constant support over the years. I would also like to thank Bernard Caillaud
and Ludovic Renou for the comments they provided on an earlier draft, as well as Andrea Mattozzi for having helped me
improving on the readibility of a previous version of this paper. I am responsable for all errors and imprecisions. This work
would not have been possible without the nancial support of the Lavoisier Program (French Ministry of Foreign A¤airs)
yEuropean University Institute. e-mail : carlos_bowles@yahoo.fr
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1 Introduction
Public institutions or government agencies are typically given large powers. As it is well known that the
interests of those running the agencies may sometimes di¤er from the interests of those for which the agencies
are run, one would expect that the precise tasks that the agencies will carry out are clearly dened in their
mandate, to avoid having them doing something di¤erent than what they should do. In practice, however,
the mandates given to institutions and agencies are very often dened in only general terms, leaving them
a lot of room of manoeuver to decide the type of activity in which they will engage or not. In fact, it may
even be the case that agencies end up doing something completely di¤erent than what was initially foreseen.
For instance, the European Central Bank, who was initially given the mandate to carry out monetary policy
tasks for the euro area, ended up being engaged into the implementation of scal adjustment programs in
so-called "mission countries" (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, etc.). The International Monetary Fund, whose
initial task was to ensure exchange rate stability, ended up nancing members with balance of payment
problems and assisting members in poverty reduction programs after the collapse of the Bretton Wood
xed exchange rate system had made its initial task irrelevant looking forward. In a non nancial domain,
the French Constitutional Court, whose initial task was to make sure that the various branches of the
government (legislative, executive and judiciary) would not go beyond the limits assigned to them by the
1958 Constitution, ended up also assessing the compliance of laws regarding fundamental rights, a taks which
was not explicitly assigned to them by the Constitutional Committee who designed the Constitution.
Why would society let public institutions decide to do what they want at the risk of having them doing
the wrong thing? So far, the one explanation provided by the literature to explain why agencies are given
some freedom to decide on which task they will engage is based on incentive to e¤orts reasons. The bulk of
the reasoning is that the principal is in practice better o¤ to let the agent decide on the task (often referred
to in the litterature as a project instead of a task) it will engage into as long as there is some convergence of
interests between them, for the risk of having the agents choice overruled by the principal would otherwise
reduce the agents e¤orts to gather information on the pay-o¤ of possible tasks/projects. In this paper, I am
trying to bring another -simple, intuitive and yet, to my knowledge, new - explanation: agencies are given
some freedom to decide on which task they will engage into because the future is uncertain and they need
to be able to adapt to circumstances as they arise. The change in the way agencies carry out their mandate
over time would therefore simply reect the need to adjust to a changing world. The explanation I propose
is therefore based on exibility needs, similar in essence as those presented by Kreps (1979)
To proceed with the explanation, I am drawing on an extension of the principal-agent model built by
Aghion and Tirole (1997). In their paper, a principal (she) and an agent (he) can implement one or zero
project. The principal hires the agent to collect information and implement the project. The projects yields
di¤erent pay-o¤s to the principal and the agent. The principal can either retain authority and over-rule
the agents choice or let the agent decide on which project to implement, once the information on pay-o¤s
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is known. In this setting, a basic trade-o¤ between loss of control and initiative arise. The principal may
decide to keep authority over decisions, but that will be at the expense of having the agent making less e¤ort
to ascertain the pay-o¤ structure of available projects. The principal may decide to let the agent decide on
which project to implement, which will induce the agent to make more e¤ort to gather information, but at
the expense of not having the principals preferred project eventually picked. In this setting, it is however
not possible to explain why tasks would need to be adjusted to adapt to a changing world because the world
is basically not changing: the preference of the principal over the available projects do not change depending
on the state of the world. In order to introduce that explanation, I will therefore, contrary to Aghion and
Tirole (1997), assume that the preferences of the principal are state-dependent. Another di¤erence is that
I will assume that the principal has the possibility to restrict the set of projects available for the agent to
pick (which I refer to as tasks, rather than projects, for the sake of stressing the institutional dimension).
I will also proceed with further simplications of their model to keep as much as possible the focus on
the explanation I am bringing. In particular, in order to avoid having a trade-o¤ between delegation and
authority retention blurring the focus of the analysis, I will take away the trade-o¤ from the model by
assuming that the principal always needs the agent to implement the project.
In essence, my model works as follows. There is one principal (she) and one agent (he). The principal
needs the agent to carry out a task (or project), although she does not know ex-ante which task she would
like to be carried out because this will depend on how the world will look like tomorrow. One may for
instance think about a society delegating monetary policy to a central bank, without specifying whether
such a policy should be restrictive or expansive because this will depend on whether the economy is in
recession or in expansion, which is itself not known when the mandate is drafted. To keep things simple, I
assume that there are only two main possible tasks and two main possible states of the world (for technical
reasons, the model also features a third task and a third state of the world, but this can be ignored in this
presentation - I will come back to this in the modelling section). In the one state of the world, both the
agent and the principal want to implement the same task. In the other state of the world, their preferred
task di¤ers, although they still derive some utility from having their non-preferred task implemented (in the
above example of monetary policy, this may the bias of the agent towards one specic task may be compared
to the so-called restrictive bias of central bankers, which may di¤er from the preference of the citizens at a
given point in time). The possible tasks, the possible states of the world and their associated probabilities
of materialisation are known by both the principal and the agent. The state of the world is however not
observable without engaging into information gathering, which comes at some cost for the agent. I assume
that the principal is not able to observe the state of the world, but is able to detect with some probability
when the agent does not pick the principals preferred task when aware of the state of the world. The
probability to be detected is also known by the agent, and is decided upon by the principal taking into
account that it will take her some e¤ort. Once the agent knows the state of the world he is in, he decides on
the task he will implement, which will also depend on how much room for maneuver hes been initially given
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by the principal before the state of the world was known. Should he end up picking the task non-preferred
by the principal, he will receive an exogenous penalty. To sum up, the situation we describe is as follows:
the principal decides the set of tasks among which the agent can chose, the agents gather some information
about the state of the world and decides on which task to implement, the principal possibly punish the agent
in case she detects some non-desired activity.
With these modelling assumptions, I obtain the following new result that the principal may decide to
give some discretion to the agent on which task to implement because this may help her adjust to new
circumstances. The discretion left to the agent is therefore not necessarily motivated by the need to induce
him to make more e¤orts to collect information on pay-o¤s. Another result I obtain - which is this time more
counterintuitive - is that the principal may decide to take away the possibility for the agent to implement the
principalspreferred task. The reason for this is that excluding this task also means that the principal will
be able to save on monitoring costs, while the agent will in turn know that he will not risk any punishment
should he not take the decision he prefers. Finally, I also conrm that it may be sometimes interesting for
the principal to also allow the implementation of her non-preferred task in order to incentivize the agent to
produce some e¤orts.
2 Relation to the existing litterature
My paper relates to the literature on delegation and incentives. A very relevant paper is that of Armstrong
and Vickers (2010), which also present a principal agent model where the principal inuences the agents
behaviour by specifying the permitted set of projects among which the agent can chose his preferred one.
They nd that the principal will exclude some desirable projects from the permitted set to avoid that some
projects which are highly valued by the agent but less so by the principal end up being picked (which they
do via the characterisation of a so-called threshold ruleexcluding all projects whose intrinsic utility for the
principal is too low). They also nd that the more the principal cares about the utility of the agent, the
more discretion the agent is given in the sense that a higher fraction of projects are permitted (a similar
result to the "ally principle"). In a variant of their benchmark model, they introduce agents incentive to
discover projects similar as in my paper, where by exerting some costly e¤ort the agent nds a project with
some probability. They nd that the principal may allow some undesirable project for the sake of stimulating
agents e¤orts.
In my paper, I do also nd that it may be desirable to exclude the agents preferred task from the contract
to avoid having the task being picked up at the expense of the principals preferred task. I also nd that
the bigger the convergence of interests between the principal and the agent, measured by the opportunity
cost resulting from not picking the preferred project, the wider the discretion left to the agent generally.
However, I also nd that when the probability that the interests will be the same is high enough, it may be
even better to restrict the set of permitted tasks in order to save on the monitoring costs needed to ensure
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that the agents does not pick its preferred task at the expense of the principal should the divergence of
interest materialise. Turning back to for incentive to e¤orts reasons, I also nd that the principal allows
the agent to possibly take on non-preferred tasks. This only happens, however, when the opportunity cost
resulting from not picking the preferred project is not too high, otherwise restricting choices still make sense
as one saves monitoring and the agent will generally be better o¤ by carrying the project than doing nothing.
My paper is also related to Bester and Krähmers paper on Delegation and Incentives (2008). Their paper
is close to mine in the sense that they do introduce a project selection stage in which the principal decides
to let the agent choose the project he wishes. In their setting, they nd that the principal is less likely to
let the agent decide which project to pick for incentive to e¤ort reasons, as the e¤orts of the agent takes
place after the project has been determined and the agents always derive a private benet from the project
completion. The principal can therefore always ensure herself at least the same pay-o¤ as under delegation.
This di¤ers from my paper where, as in Aghion and Tirole (1997), the principal allows the agent to take
on non-preferred tasks for incentive to e¤orts reason. My paper also di¤ers from theirs as my setting only
considers delegation cases, where the agent is the only one who can select the project to implement. While
in their setting the agent always end up choosing his preferred project if he has been delegated authority, in
my setting the agent may sometimes choose the principals project to avoid being punished by the principal
for having cheated.
Finally, another relevant paper is that of Alonso & Matouschek (2008) on Optimal Delegation, which
models a situation where the principal commits to a set of decision from which the agent chooses his preferred
one, in a situation where the principal cannot implement contingent transfers. The authors then characterize
the optimal delegation set and perform comparative statics on the principals willingness to delegate and
the agents discretion. They nd that the conditions for so-called interval delegation (that is, letting the
agent make any decision from a single interval, a la Holmström (1977) to be optimal are satised when the
agents preferences are su¢ ciently aligned. In contrast, my paper shows that the principal may still nd it
optimal to let the agent have some discretion regarding the project choices even when the probability that
their interest diverge is large.
3 The model
3.1 Basic Settings
The model is a stylised extension of Aghion and Tiroles (1997) model on formal and real authority to a
situation where utilities are state-contigent.
Players and projects. There is a principal P (she) and an agent A (he). The agent can implement a
project z 2 Z = fz1; z2; z3g, while the principal cannot (for instance because some technical competence is
needed, which only the agent has). The principal is however able to restrict the choice of projects that the
14
agent will be able to implement to some subset ZP of 2Z (say, because she can forbid by law the agent to
do things that she clearly does not want him to do). She is also able to inict a penalty F to the agent in
case the agent does not behave as agreed. Monetary transfers are excluded.
Pay-o¤ structure.The implementation of the project brings some pay-o¤ to both the agent and the
principal, which depend on the state of the world they are in. The respective pay-o¤ are shown in the table
below, where 1 (resp. ,with 0    1) is the utility of the principal (resp. the agent ) when the project
z1 is achieved in the state of the world s1; whose probability is p1:
UP (z); UA(z; e)
s1 s2 s3
Prob p1 p2 p3
z1 1;  ;   1; 1
z2 ; 1 1; 1  1; 1
z3 0; 0 0; 0 0; 0
Hence, there is one state of the world (s2) where both the principal and the agent have the same
preference over the projects (z2 being their preferred one), while in another state of the world (s1) their
preference diverge (with z1 being preferred by the principal while z2 is preferred by the agent). In a third
state of the world (s3), both the principal and the agent would su¤er an innite disutility should z1 or z2
be implemented. One can think of that state of the world as standing for a situation where doing standard
things may amount to doing a big mistake - a situation which may not happen very often but may still be
worth avoiding. In that situation, then the best thing to do may be to opt for a safe project (z3), which
may not bring any pay-o¤ but does not bring anything negative either. The reason for introducing such
a situation in the model is to represent situations where the agent will prefer avoiding taking any chances
in case the information he has on which state he is in is not good enough for him to decide. One can for
instance think about the case of a judge, who may hesitate between giving a big or a small sanction to punish
someone charged with some crime, but nally opt for no sanction at all because the evidence available is too
weak to prevail and the doubt eventually benets to the accused person. For that reason, we assume that
the project z3 is always available for the agent to implement.1
Information structure. The distribution of probability of the respective states of the world is common
knowledge. The principal and the agent do not know which state of the world they are in but they can
obtain the information with some probability e (resp. E), ranging from at the cost of some disutility
gA(e
) (resp. gP (E)). For i = A;P we also assume that gi(:) is strictly increasing and strictly convex, with
gi(0) > 0; g
0
i(0) = 0; g
0
i(1) = 1: The assumption that gi(0) > 0 (which basically means that even ignorance
1Having innitely negative entries in the pay-o¤ table are not strictly needed to generate a situation where the agent opt
for the safe action in case of ignorance. It would be enough to have some "su¢ ciently big " negative pay-o¤, whose value could
be computed depending on the parameters. However, this would bring additional complexity in the model, without brining
additional insight.
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does not come up for free) reects the existence of xed costs in the information technology. One can see
these costs as some amount that the principal and the agent would have to pay before entering in the game,
in order to make sure that the information technology is available for them to useafter the game has started.
Monitoring technology. The principal is able to inict a penalty F if she observes that the agent does
not implement her preferred project among the permitted subset of actions available to him. The level of
penalty is exogenous. We assume that there is some rigidity in the monitoring technology, in the sense that
the principal has to punish the agent once she receives the information that the agent did not implement
her preferred project while he could have. One could think of this mechanism as a pre-commitment device,
whereby the principal is ex-post forced to inict the penalty she announced ex-ante. This could describe a
situation where the nature of the monitoring technology is such that the triggering of the penalty is tied with
the discovery of the "breach " (for instance in a computer-run monitoring device which would automatically
suspend an account in case fraudulent movements are detected). This could also represent a situation where
the principal needs to comply with the penalty announced out of credibility reasons non modelled here.
Timing. The principal designs a contract C specifying the set of permitted projects for the agent
ZP 2 ZP  ffz1; z3g ; fz2; z3g ; fz1; z2; z3gg and the project to be implemented depending on the state of
the world observed by the agent (e.g. a message m : ZP  S ! fz1; z2; z3g where S = fs1; s2; s3g). She
also decides on her level of e¤ort E, which is observable by the agent, and pays the cost gP (E):The agent
accepts or rejects the contract. On acceptance, the agent decides on his e¤ort level e and pay the cost
gA(e
): Nature picks the state of the world. The principal and the agent are informed on the state of the
world with probability E and e. Based on the information available, the agent makes his project choice.
The principal observes the agents project choice. If the principal knows the state of the world and if it turns
out that the agent did not implement the principals preferred project while he could have, the agent su¤ers
the penalty F .
Actions and strategies. The Principals set of possible actions is dened over C  E where C stands
for the set of possible contracts and E  [0; 1] is the interval of possible e¤ort choices. The Agent set of
actions is dened over C e fz1; z2; z3g where e  [0; 1] is the interval of possible agent e¤ort choices.The
combination of the possible actions for the principal and the agent dene the set of all proles of pure
strategies.
Equilibrium concept. We will use subgame perfection as equilibrium concept and solve the game via
backward induction.
3.2 Model resolution
We solve the model by starting with the last decision to be made, which is the agent decision regarding the
project to pick among the set of permitted projects and his level of e¤ort. We then look into the principals
decision regarding the set of permitted projects and her level of e¤ort, incorporating the impact this will
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have on agents decisions.
3.2.1 Agents program
The agents behaviour will depend on the set of permitted projects. We will refer to the set of permitted
project fz1; z2; z3g as the exibility case, while the set of permitted projects fz1; z3g and fz2; z3g will be
referred to as inexibility cases.
The agent will select the e¤ort level e which maximizes his utility UA :
e = argmaxUA(z; e)
The utility of the agent depends on the set of permitted projects (as decided by the principal) and on
the states of the world. We need to look at each of the three possible set of permitted projects.
Case 1 : The set of permitted projects is fz1; z3g : In this case, either the e¤orts of the agent paid o¤,
meaning that he knows the state of the world and picks z1; or his e¤orts did not pay o¤, meaning that he
his not informed about the state of the worlds and picks z3: His utility function therefore writes:
UA(fz1; z3g ; e) = e(p1 + p2)  gA(e)
and the First Order Condition is:
@UA
@e
= 0) e = g0 1A ((p1 + p2))
Note that e is dened as (p1+p2) 2 [0; 1] and g0 : [0; 1]! [0;+1]meaning that g0 1A ((p1+p2)) 2 [0; 1].
Case 2: The set of permitted projects is fz2; z3g : In this case, either the e¤orts of the agent paid o¤,
meaning that he knows the state of the world and picks z2; or his e¤orts did not pay o¤, meaning that he
his not informed about the state of the worlds and is picks z3: His utility function writes:
UA(fz2; z3g ; e) = e(p1 + p2)  gA(e)
and the First Order Condition is:
@UA
@e
= 0) e = g0 1A ((p1 + p2))
Case 3 ( "exibility "): The set of permitted projects is fz1; z2; z3g. This case is a bit more complicated
to formalize, as the agent may nd himself in the state of the world s1 where he has to chose between picking
the principals preferred project or picking his own preferred project but with the risk of being detected
by the principal with some probability E and, if this is the case, pay some punishment F: We formalise
this choice via a binary variable c taking value over f0; 1g where c = 0 means that the agent chooses the
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principals preferred project while c = 1 means that he choses his own preferred project. Under exibility,
the utility function of the agent therefore becomes:
UA(fz1; z2; z3g ; e) = e[p1((1  c)+ c(1  EF )) + p2]  gA(e)
The First Order Condition is :
@UA
@e
= 0) g0A(e) = p1((1  c)+ c(1  EF )) + p2
, e = g0 1A (p1((1  c)+ c(1  EF )) + p2)
the agent will therefore only pick his own preferred project if the benet he gets for doing so, taking
into account the expected punishment he will su¤er (e.g. 1  EF ) is above the benet he would get when
picking the principals preferred project (e.g.). We therefore have:
if   1  EF then we have c = 0 and e = g0 1A (p1+ p2)
otherwise, if  < 1  EF; then we have c = 1 and e = g0 1A (p1(1  EF ) + p2)
3.2.2 Principals Program
The principal designs the contract that maximizes her expected utility taking into account the optimal level
of e¤ort of the agent.
She therefore needs to decide on how much exibility she wants to give to her agent, depending on the
expected agents behaviour, which itself depends on the value of the parameters. To do so, the principal
will have to compare the utility she can expect from each of the three possible set of permitted projects. We
have to write down the utility of the principal depending on each of the three cases.
Case 1 : The set of permitted projects is fz1; z3g : In this situation, the agent is informed of the state of
the world with some probability e = g0 1A ((p1+ p2)), in which case he always pick project z1 which for the
principal brings a utility of 1 when the state of the world is s1 or a utility of  when the state of the world
is p2: Using the F.O.C of the agent in case 1, the utility of the principal writes:
UP (fz1; z3g; e) = e(p1 + p2)
= g0 1A ((p1 + p2))(p1 + p2)
Case 2 : The set of permitted projects is fz2; z3g : In this situation, the agent is informed of the state of
the world with some probability e = g0 1A ((p1 + p2)), in which case the agent always pick project z2 which
for the principal brings a utility of  in state s1 and 1 in state s2: Using the F.O.C of the agent in case 2,
the utility of the principal writes:
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UP (fz2; z3g; e) = e(p1+ p2)
= g0 1A ((p1 + p2))(p1+ p2)
Case 3 ( "exibility "): The set of permitted projects is fz1; z2; z3g : This case is, again, slightly more
complicated to formalize as the principal also needs to decide on its level of monitoring. From the program of
the agent, we know that the monitoring only brings incentives for the agent to pick the principals preferred
task when the probability for the agent to be detected is above a certain threeshold E  1 F : This costs
however gP (E) to the principal. Going above this threeshold does not bring additional incentives for the
agent, only more costs for the principal. Going below the threeshold does result into having the agent picking
the principals project, while the principal s e¤orts are costly. Overall, the principal should either decide
to monitor and set E  1 F or renounce to the monitoring and set E = 0, depending of the value of the
parameters. We need to look at both possibilities in turn.
When the principal decides to engage into monitoring, her expected utility writes down:
UP (fz1; z2;z3g; e) = g
0 1
A (p1+ p2)(p1 + p2)  gP (E)
= g
0 1
A (p1+ p2)(p1 + p2)  gP (
1  
F
)
When the principal decides not to engage into monitoring, her expected utility writes down:
UP (fz1; z2;z3g; e) = g
0 1
A (p1 + p2)(p1+ p2)  gP (E)
= g
0 1
A (p1 + p2)(p1+ p2)  gP (0)
In that last situation, it becomes clear that allowing the set of permitted projects to be fz1; z2; z3g
without engaging into monitoring does not bring better utility than restricting the set of permitted projects
to fz2; z3g as the principal will have to pay gP (0) > 0: Allowing fz1; z2; z3g therefore only makes sense when
the principal engages into monitoring with E = 1 F
Comparing the utility derived by the principal in all three cases, it becomes clear that exibility is chosen
by the principal if and only if :
UP (fz1; z2; z3g; e) > UP (fz1; z3g; e)
that is
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g
0 1
A (p1+ p2)(p1 + p2)  gP (
1  
F
) > g0 1A ((p1 + p2))(p1 + p2)
and
UP (fz1; z2; z3g; e) > UP (fz2; z3g; e)
that is
g
0 1
A (p1+ p2)(p1 + p2)  gP (
1  
F
) > g0 1A (p1 + p2)(p1+ p2)
This brings us to the following propositition:
Proposition 1 Flexibility is strictly preferred by the principal if and only if:
g
0 1
A (p1+ p2)(p1 + p2)  g0 1A ((p1 + p2))(p1 + p2) > gP (
1  
F
) (1)
and
g
0 1
A (p1+ p2)(p1 + p2)  g0 1A (p1 + p2)(p1+ p2) > gP (
1  
F
) (2)
3.3 Trade-o¤s
The table below summarizes the situation from the perspective of the agents e¤ort and the principals utility
in the three cases:
Inexibility 1 (Case 1)
Set of permitted projects fz1; z3g
Agents optimal e¤ort level e = g0 1A ((p1 + p2))
Principals utility achieved UP (z; e) = g0 1A ((p1 + p2))(p1 + p2)
Flexibility (Case 3)
Set of permitted projects fz1; z2; z3g
Agents optimal e¤ort level e = g0 1A (p1+ p2)
Principals utility achieved UP (z; e) = g
0 1
A (p1+ p2)(p1 + p2)  gP ( 1 F )
Inexibility 2 (Case 2)
Set of permitted projects fz2; z3g
Agents optimal e¤ort level e = g0 1A ((p1 + p2))
Principals utility achieved UP (z; e) = g0 1A ((p1 + p2))(p1+ p2)
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The table shows that the agents e¤orts are bigger when he knows that he will be able to pick his
preferred action in all state of the worlds (Inexibility 2), compared to a situation where he would only
be able to pick his preferred action sometimes (Flexibility) or never (Inexibility 1) - as g0 1A is increasing
and p1 + p2  p1 + p2  (p1 + p2). There is therefore for the principal a cost to extend the set of
projects permitted to the agent or even to restrict it in a way that the agent would be forced to only pick
his non-preferred project.
The cost for the principal of extending the set of permitted projects may however be counterbalanced
by the added utility that the principal will obtain from having her preferred project picked in all states of
the world, which can be seen by comparing her utility in the case Flexibility against her utility in the case
Inexibility 2, (p1 + p2) being above (p1 + p2): This situation will however be only interesting under the
condition that the monitoring costs gP ( 1 F ) are comparatively not too high.
When the monitoring costs are too high, it may prove more protable to restrict the set of permitted
projects. It may however be preferable for the principal to force the agent to always pick her non-preferred
project, even though this may result into lowering the agents e¤orts, should this be compensated by the
utility increase coming from the fact that the action preferred by the principal may be much more often
picked. This would happen when p1 is "su¢ ciently big " and  is "not too low " in order to make the
di¤erence (p1 + p2)  (p1+ p2) = (p1   p2)(1  ) su¢ ciently positive to compensate the loss induced by
the fact that g0 1A ((p1 + p2)) is below g
0 1
A ((p1 + p2)):
A simple way to grasp the essence of the trade-o¤s is to assume that p3 is su¢ ciently negligible to be
ignored, which helps simplifying notations by setting p1 = 1  p2. One can then reformulate the principals
utility as a function of the variable x = (1  )p1, as in the table below:
Principals utility achieved
Inexibility 1 (Case 1) g0 1A ()(x+ )
Flexibility (Case 3) g
0 1
A (1  x)  gP ( 1 F )
Inexibility 2 (Case 2) g0 1A (1)(1  x)
As can be observed in the table, the functions showing the utility achieved by the principal in the
inexibility cases are both linear in x, with the rst one upward sloping and the second one downward
sloping.
4 Example with a specic functional form
4.1 Derivation of the specic equations
We take a specic parameterized form for the cost functions gi(). For i = A;P , and we dene :
gi(x) =   ln(1  x2)
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where  > 0 is a parameter.
It follows that :
g0i(x) = 
2x
1  x2
We can check that g0i(0) = 0 and g
0
i(1) =1 and that gi() is increasing and strictly convex.
The reciprocal of g0i(x) can be obtained by reassembling all terms into a second degree equation and
solving in x:
y = 
2x
1  x2
which can be re-expressed as a second order equation:
yx2 + 2x  y = 0
and factorized as follows:
(x 
q
(2 + y2)  
y
)(x 
  
q
(2 + y2)
y
) = 0
We therefore have :
g0 1i (x) =
1
x
(
q
(2 + x2)  )
or
g0 1i (x) =  
1
x
(
q
(2 + x2)  )
depending on the denition domain at stake.
The conditions for a preference for exibility to appear are therefore (assuming the parameters value are
such that the correct reciprocal function for g0i is the rst of the two ones above):
UP (fz1; z2; z3g; e) > UP (fz1; z3g; e)
that is, as derived in equation (1) above:
g
0 1
A (p1+ p2)(p1 + p2)  g0 1A ((p1 + p2))(p1 + p2)  gP (
1  
F
) > 0
which is
1
(p1+ p2)
q
2 + (p1+ p2)2   

(p1 + p2)
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  1
(p1 + p2)
q
2 + ((p1 + p2))2   

(p1 + p2) +  ln(1  (1  
F
)2) > 0
and
UP (fz1; z2; z3g; e) > UP (fz2; z3g; e)
that is, as derived in equation (2) above:
g
0 1
A (p1+ p2)(p1 + p2)  g0 1A (p1 + p2)(p1+ p2)  gP (
1  
F
) > 0
which is
1
(p1+ p2)
q
(2 + (p1+ p2)2   

(p1 + p2)
  1
(p1 + p2)
q
(2 + (p1 + p2)2)  

(p1+ p2) +  ln(1  (1  
F
)2) > 0
Assuming p3 is su¢ ciently negigible to set p2 = 1  p1; it is possible to simplify the equations as follows:
, 1
(p1(  1) + 1)
q
2 + (p1(  1) + 1)2   

  1

q
2 + ()2   

(p1(  1) + ) +  ln(1  (1  
F
)2) > 0
, 1
(p1(  1) + 1)
q
2 + (p1(  1) + 1)2   

 
q
(2 + 1)  

(p1(  1) + 1) +  ln(1  (1  
F
)2) > 0
4.2 Comparative statics
Figure 1 illustrates the comparative statics at play with given values for ;  and F . In situations where the
frequency of convergent interests is low, it is in the interest of the principal to force the agent to only pick
his non-preferred task. When the frequency of converging interests increases, "investing " in monitoring
becomes more interesting for the sake of capturing the benet arising from exibility. However, there is
one level of frequency of converging interests above which it is just better for the principal to save on the
monitoring costs and increase the agents e¤orts by letting the agent only pick the task he prefers. The
impact of a change in the parameter  is illustrated in Figure 2. Reducing the  makes exibility generally
less interesting compared to other menus as it increases monitoring costs.
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The relation between  and p1 is depicted in Figure 3,2 which provides the area where each of the three
menu is preferred. The higher the , the bigger the area where exibility is preferred. Figure 4 depicts
the impact of an increase in the exogenous penalty factor F (from 1 to 1.5), which is to increase the area
where exibility is preferred, because of a reduction in monitoring costs. A similar impact is obtained when
changing the parameter  of the functional form taken for the monitoring costs. Figure 5 shows that an
increase of  (from 0.8 to 1.2) leads to a reduction of the area for which exibility is optimal.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I formalized the intuition that the discretionary power of institutions in mission setting may
reect the preference for exibility of the principal, in the sense that the principal may prefer to give some
room for maneuver to her agent in order to let him adapt to new circumstances. Preference for exibility
framework models a two-step process where a decision-maker uncertain about her future preferences rst
chooses an opportunity set among the set of all the subset of possible alternatives. In a second stage, once
the uncertainty is resolved, the decision-maker nally picks one alternative among the opportunity set. I
extended this analysis to an agency theoretic framework by introducing the hazard moral problem analyzed
by Aghion and Tirole (1997) into the two-stage decision process of Kreps (1979). The crucial point of my
model is that the rst stage decision is made by the principal that chooses a subset of allowed tasks among
the set of possible tasks, while in the second stage, the decision is made by the agent. I could show that the
principal may decide to let some exibility to the agent when the convergence of interests is relatively high.
Using a specic functional form, I could show that the size of the set of parameters for which exibility is
preferred is decreasing with the monitoring costs.
An interesting avenue for future research could be to give some more "economic esh" to the missions
considered in this theoretical model, investigating the di¤erent domains of economic policy where agencies
end up having some freedom of choice regarding their mandate. For instance, there is currently a substantial
discussion regarding whether quantiative easing is or is not within the mandate given to the European
Central Bank, with the line of divide often reecting di¤erences in national preferences among the voters
of di¤erent EU member states but also di¤erence in priors regarding the need for extraordinary measures
in the wake of an unprecedented nancial crisis. It could be interesting to try to determine under which
conditions a central bank could be given some exibility in the set of instrument it will use, depending on
the probability of appearance of a systemic crisis, also taking into account the risk that overstepping the
mandate may sometimes go against the preference of the majority of the voters from which the central bank
is deriving its mandate.
2Figure 3 and Figure 4 have been obtained using a loop in Matlab investigating for each value of  and p1 the menu bringing
the highest utility for the principal. This lead to the area shown in the gures.
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Figure 3 (beta=0.8,F=1) 
 
 
Figure 4 (beta=0.8,F=1.5) 
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Figure 4 (beta=1.2,F=1) 
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Abstract
This paper provides "ready-to-apply" procedures, based on generat-
ing functions, which allow to compute power indices in weighted majority
games restricted by an a priori system of unions. We illustrate these meth-
ods by an application to the International Monetary Fund. We compare
the empirical properties of the coalitional and traditional power indices
keeping the game xed or allowing for variations in its set of parameters.
Keywords: simple game; coalitional value; generating function; IMF
AMS classication: 91A12,91A80.
1 Introduction
How can we assess the relative distribution of power in a Committee when the
voting rule requires the players to vote by groups instead of voting separately
but let them free to choose the group they will join ?
This situation, though a bit odd, is not unlikely at all. The IMF statutes,
for instance, ask the member states to meet in a limited number of groups -the
so-called constituencies- before allowing a vote at the Executive Board, its main
decision-making committee. The number of players is indeed so large (184 coun-
tries) that e¢ ciency of the mechanism design requires to put some constraints
on the size of the committee that will decide for the whole (in this case, 24
groups, each of them represented by a single Executive Director). Under this
specic set of rules, the vote does not take place with the initial set of players,
but with a partition involving only some subsets of it (the representatives of the
constituencies). Once the groups are formed, each of them is endowed with the
Corresponding author. E-mail address: carlos.bowles@iue.it
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sum of the voting rights of its individual components without having the right
to split them.
The traditional power indices derived from cooperative game theory, namely
the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices (Banzhaf, 1965; Shapley and
Shubik, 1954), are unable to help us in measuring the distribution of power in
this case. Their main strength is to provide a su¢ cient statistic of the proba-
bility that some player might be pivotal during a vote, in the sense that he/she
might be able to transform a losing coalition into a winning one. Assuming
some a priori uniform distribution under a veil of ignorance is indeed a strong
and simplifying advantage. But when there exists some additional information
about the coalition structure this assumption becomes too weak.
One way to take care about this additional information, without throwing
away solution concepts that proved to be powerful in the past (playing a bit with
words), is to apply them to a slightly modied game. Instead of considering a
game over the whole set of players, dene it over some subsets of the set of
players. This can still provide a useful information about the distribution of
power, as Leech (2002) did it for the IMF Executive Board in a recent issue of
this journal. But what about the distribution of power within such restricted
coalitions ? In particular: how should we take into account that some players
pertaining to a given group must be rewarded for bringing their voting rights
to it ? Here, inference about power needs the use of di¤erent instruments.
From a theoretical point of view, the a priori union framework initiated by
Owen (1977) turned out to be the relevant one for addressing the aforementioned
problem. The main advantage of the method is to correct the analytical expres-
sion of the indices, taking into account the modication of the probability space,
while keeping track of their fundamental axiomatic properties with respect to
both within and between unions allocation of rewards. We consider three power
indices in this context: the Owen value (Owen, 1977), a modication of the
Shapley-Shubik power index, the Banzhaf-Owen value (Owen, 1982), a mod-
ication of the Banzhaf power index, and the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf
index (Alonso-Meijide and Fiestras-Janeiro, 2002) at half-distance between the
Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices.
This paper aims at providing some "ready-to-apply" procedures for comput-
ing the coalitional power indices. One of the strengths of these procedures is
that they allow to get exact values of the indices, including for large games -
no need for laborious approximation methods. Furthermore, the time required
for the computation is in practice much lower than the one required for the
computation of the traditional Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices. This is so
because the method, drawn from Cantors (see Lucas, 1983) and Brams and
A¤uso (1976) early work, extended since by Fernández et al. (2002) for the My-
erson value and by Algaba et al. (2003) for weighted multiple majority games,
takes advantage of the properties of formal series called generating functions.
Roughly, a generating function is a polynomial that allows to enumerate the set
of possible coalitions, while keeping track of their respective weights.
This paper also applies these procedures to the IMF distribution of power.
The application of the traditional power indices to situations where there are
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some a priori unions is shown to lead to a mistaken assessment of the distribution
of power in a weighted majority game - justifying ex post and not only ex ante
the interest of these renements. One related striking interest is that coalitional
power indices are sensitive to changes in the coalition structure, while traditional
power indices are not.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we recall some preliminary
denitions and the notions of generating function and power indices for games
with an a priori system of unions. In section 3 we introduce the procedures to
compute these power indices by means of generating functions, and provide a
simple example of computation by hand. In section 4 we apply these proce-
dures to the IMF weighted majority game in order to illustrate by a large game
the di¤erence in behavior of the three coalitional power indices considered in
this paper. Section 5 is dedicated to concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
An n-person cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game) is a pair
(N; v) where N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng is the set of players and v; the characteristic
function, is a real valued function on the subsets of N such that v (;) = 0:
A subset S of N is called a coalition. A (0   1) game is a TU game in
which the function v only takes the values 0 and 1: A (0   1) game is a sim-
ple game if it is not identically 0, and obeys the condition of monotonicity
(v (T )  v (S) whenever T  S) : In simple games, a coalition S is winning if
v (S) = 1; and losing if v (S) = 0: We will denote by W the set of all winning
coalitions of a simple game (N; v) and by SI (N) the set of simple games with
player set N:
A simple game (N; v) is a weighted majority game if there exists a set of
weights w1; w2; :::; wn for players, with wi  0; 1  i  n, and a quota q 2 R+
such that S 2 W if and only if w (S)  q, where w (S) =Pi2S wi: A weighted
majority game is represented by [q;w1; w2; :::; wn] :
A power index is a function f : SI (N)  ! Rn which assigns to a simple
game (N; v) a vector f (N; v), where the real number fi (N; v) is the power of
player i in the game (N; v) according to f .
The most important power indices are the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-
Shubik index (hereafter BZ and SH ). These indices can be written in this way:1
fi (N; v) =
X
SNni
piS (v (S [ i)  v (S)) ; for any i 2 N;
where piS = 1=2
n 1 for the BZ index and piS = s! (n  s  1)!=n! for the SH in-
dex. These two probability measures are, according to Felsenthal and Machover
(1998), the main two underlying the various existing power indices in the liter-
ature. The BZ index is based on the combination of players and the SH index
1Let S be a nite set. We denote by s the cardinality of S; i.e., jSj = s. As it has become
common practice, given i 2 S we will write for simplicity S n i instead of S n fig ; and given
i =2 S we will write SS i instead of SS fig :
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is based on their permutations. Intuitively, the basic unit of analysis for the BZ
index is the coalition, while the SH index focuses on the ranking of individual
preferences over a given outcome. In both cases, each basic measurable event -
coalition or ranking of preferences - is assumed to have an equal probability.
Taking into account that for a simple game v (T ) = 1 if T 2W and v(T ) = 0
otherwise, it holds that v(S [ i)  v(S) = 1 if and only if S is losing and S [ i
is winning. In this case, we say that the pair of coalitions (S; S [ i) is a swing
for player i. Given a simple game (N; v) ; SH and BZ power indices of a player
i 2 N depend on the number of swings for player i.
In general, the computation of the previous indices needs a great number
of operations. The generating function is one of the procedures to compute
them. Generating functions give a method to count the number of elements
c (r) of a nite set, where these elements have a conguration that depends on
a characteristic r: An application of these functions in the eld of simple games
allows to recover the number of possible coalitions of a given kind from the set
of its coe¢ cients, while the voting power of the coalition can easily be read
looking at its set of exponents. Brams and A¤uso (1976) provide an example of
generating function very easy to understand for the clasical power indices.
The generating function of the numbers a = fa0; a1; a2; : : :g is the formal
series fa (t) =
P
j ajt
j ; and can be nite or innite. The variable t serves to
identify aj as the coe¢ cient corresponding to tj in fa (t) :
In some cases, we will employ generating functions of several variables, for
example
S (x; y; z) =
X
k0
X
j0
X
l0
c (k; j; l)xkyjzl;
where c (k; j; l) are real numbers that depend on k; j and l:
Let us consider a nite set N = f1; : : : ; ng. We will denote by P (N) the
set of all partitions of N . An element P 2 P (N) is called a coalition structure
or a system of unions of the set N . A simple game with a coalition structure
is a triplet (N; v; P ), where (N; v) 2 SI (N) and P 2 P (N). We will denote
by SU (N) the family of all simple games with player set N and a coalition
structure.
In this case, a power index is a function f : SU (N)  ! Rn which assigns a
vector f (N; v; P ) to a simple game with an a priori system of unions (N; v; P ) ,
where the real number fi (N; v; P ) is the power of player i in the game (N; v; P )
according to f .
We consider three power indices for SU (N) : the Banzhaf-Owen index (here-
after BO), the Symmetric Coalitional Banzhaf index (hereafter SCB) and the
Owen index (hereafter OW): These indices can be written in this way:
fi (N; v; P ) =
X
RMnk
X
TPkni
piR;T (v (Q [ T [ i)  v (Q [ T )) ; for any i 2 N;
where M = f1; : : : ;mg, P = fP1; : : : ; Pmg, Q = [r2RPr; and Pk 2 P is the
union such that i 2 Pk: For the case of the BO index piR;T = 12m 1 12pk 1 , for
33
the SCB index piR;T =
1
2m 1
t!(pk t 1)!
pk!
and nally, for the OW index piR;T =
r!(m r 1)!
m!
t!(pk t 1)!
pk!
(Owen, 1982; Alonso-Meijide and Fiestras-Janeiro, 2002;
Owen, 1977).
According to the probability model underlying the choice of these probability
distributions, one can see that all the three coalitional power indices can be
derived from a two-level bargaining process. First, unions split the total amount
according to the SH or the BZ type of allocation. Then, each union allocates its
total reward among its members taking into account the possibility that they
might join another union using again the SH or the BZ type of allocation.
3 Using generating functions to compute power
indices restricted by a priori unions
This section is dedicated to the derivation of the generating functions of the
power indices restricted by a priori unions, that will allow us to compute them
easily. We begin rst with some denition.
Denition 1 Given a game (N; v; P ) 2 SU (N), where P = fP1; P2; : : : ; Pmg ;
a coalition S  N is compatible with the a priori system of unions P for a player
i 2 Pj, if S = [k2RMnjPk [ T , with T  Pj :
If a coalition S  N is compatible with the a priori system of unions P for
a player i 2 Pj ; then S is compatible with P for any player k 2 Pj : Then we
will denote by C(j; P ) the set of compatible coalitions with the a priori system
of unions for players of the union Pj in a game (N; v; P ) 2 SU (N) :
Denition 2 Given a game (N; v; P ) 2 SU (N) ; a compatible swing with P for
a player i 2 Pj, is a pair of coalitions (S; S [ i) such that S is losing, S 2 C(j; P )
and S [ i is winning.
We will denote by i (N; v; P ) the number of compatible swings with P for
a player i 2 N; in the game (N; v; P ) 2 SU (N) :
3.1 The Banzhaf-Owen index
Given a game (N; v; P ) 2 SU (N), where P = fP1; P2; : : : ; Pmg ; the BO index
of a player i 2 Pj is equal to:
	i (N; v; P ) =
i (N; v; P )
2m+pj 2
:
In the next result, we propose a method to compute i (N; v; P ) in a weighted
majority game with an a priori system of unions.
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Lemma 1 Let (N; v; P ) be a weighted majority game with an a priori system
of unions, with v = [q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn] and P = fP1; P2; : : : ; Pmg. The number
of compatible swings with P for a player i 2 Pj is:
i (N; v; P ) =
q 1X
k=q wi
bik;
where bik is the number of coalitions S 2 C(j; P ) such that i =2 S and w(S) = k:
Proof. Let us take a weighted majority game with an a priori system of
unions (N; v; P ) 2 SU (N) :
The compatible coalitions with P; S; for a player i 2 Pj , such that i =2 S
and, whose weight is between q   wi and q   1; are losing coalitions. When
player i joined this coalition, its weight is greater or equal than q, and then, the
coalition becomes a winning one.
If we denote by bik the number of compatible coalitions with P for i; S; such
that i =2 S with weight k between q   wi and q   1, the number of compatible
swings with P for i in (N; v; P ) is obtained by adding the numbers

bik
	
k0 for
values k between q   wi and q   1: Thus, i (N; v; P ) =
Pq 1
k=q wi b
i
k:
In the next result, we present the generating function of the numbers

bik
	
k0 :
Theorem 1 Let (N; v; P ) be a weighted majority game with an a priori sys-
tem of unions, with v = [q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn] and P = fP1; P2; : : : ; Pmg. The
generating function of numbers

bik
	
k0 for a player i 2 Pj is given by:
Bi (x) =
mY
r=1;r 6=j

1 + xw(Pr)
 pjY
l=1;jl 6=i
(1 + xwjl ) ;
where w (Pr) =
P
j2Pr
wj and Pj =

j1; j2; :::; jpj
	
:
Proof. Let us take a game (N; v; P ) 2 SU (N) with v = [q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn]
and a player i 2 Pj : We consider the function:
1 + xw(P1)

: : :

1 + xw(Pj 1)

1 + xw(Pj+1)

: : :

1 + xw(Pm)

(1 + xwj1 ) :::
: : :
 
1 + x
wjpj

= 1+
X
S2C(j;P )
Y
l2S
xwl = 1+
X
S2C(j;P )
x
P
l2S wl = 1+
X
S2C(j;P )
xw(S):
Grouping exponents of the same order and taking k = w (S), the previous
function is equal to:
w(N)X
k=0
bkx
k;
where b0 = 1 and bk; for k > 0 is the number of compatible coalitions with P
with weight k for i 2 Pj . If we want to compute the numbers

bik
	
k0, it is
su¢ cient to drop the factor (1 + xwi) :
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3.2 The Symmetric Coalitional Banzhaf index
Given a game (N; v; P ) 2 SU (N) ; where P = fP1; P2; : : : ; Pmg the SCB index
of a player i 2 Pj ; is equal to:
i (N; v; P ) =
X
fS2C(i;P )=S=2W and S[i2Wg
1
2m 1
jS \ Pj j! (pj   jS \ Pj j   1)!
pj !
=
pj 1X
l=0
1
2m 1
l! (pj   l   1)!
pj !
dil;
where dil represents the number of compatible swings with P; (S; S [ i) ; for
player i; in the game (N; v; P ), such that jS \ Pj j = l: For any value of l between
0 and pj   1;
dil =
q 1X
k=q wi
aikl;
where aikl is the number of compatible swings with P; (S; S [ i) ; for player i in
(N; v; P ) with w (S) = k and jS \ Pj j = l.
Theorem 2 Let (N; v; P ) be a weighted majority game with an a priori sys-
tem of unions, with v = [q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn] and P = fP1; P2; : : : ; Pmg. The
generating function of numbers

aikl
	
k0;l0 ; for a player i 2 Pj is given by:
Si (x; z) =
mY
r=1;r 6=j

1 + xw(Pr)
 pjY
l=1;jl 6=i
(1 + xwjl z) :
where w (Pr) =
P
j2Pr
wj and Pj =

j1; j2; :::; jpj
	
:
Proof. Let us take a game (N; v; P ) 2 SU (N) with v = [q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn]
and a player i 2 Pj : We consider the function:
1 + xw(P1)

: : :

1 + xw(Pj 1)

1 + xw(Pj+1)

: : :

1 + xw(Pm)

(1 + xwj1 z) : : :
: : :
 
1 + x
wjpj z

= 1 +
X
S2C(i;P )
Y
k2SnPj
xwk
Y
k2S\Pj
xwkz =
1 +
X
S2C(j;P )
x
P
k2S wkzjS\Pj j = 1 +
X
S2C(j;P )
xw(S)zjS\Pj j:
Grouping exponents of the same order and taking k = w (S), the previous
function is equal to:
w(N)X
k=0
pjX
l=0
aklx
kzl;
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where a00 = 1 and akl when at least one of the indices k or l is greater than
0; is the number of compatible coalitions with P; S; for i 2 Pj with w (S) = k
and jS \ Pj j = l. To compute

aikl
	
k0;l0, it is su¢ cient to drop the factor
(1 + xwi) :
The previous result gives a method to compute

aikl
	
k0;l0 : Now, it is
necessary to obtain the values dil; that can be identied by the coe¢ cients of
gi (z) =
pj 1X
l=0
dilz
l;
and, taking into account that dil =
Pq 1
k=q wi a
i
kl; it holds that:
gi (z) =
pj 1X
l=0
dilz
l =
pj 1X
l=0
24 q 1X
k=q wi
aikl
35 zl:
Thus,
Si (x; z) =
pj 1X
l=0
24w(N) wiX
k=0
aiklx
k
35 zl:
The coe¢ cients of gi (z) can be computed, selecting for any exponent of vari-
able z in Si (x; z) ; the coe¢ cients of those terms xkzl such that k takes values
between q   wi and q   1:
3.3 The Owen index
Given a game (N; v; P ) 2 SU (N) where P = fP1; P2; : : : ; Pmg ; the OW index
of a player i 2 Pj ; is equal to:
i (N; v; P ) =X
fS2C(i;P )=
S=2W and S[i2Wg
jmj (S)j! (m  jmj (S)j   1)!
m!
jS \ Pj j! (pj   jS \ Pj j   1)!
pj !
=
m 1X
r=0
pj 1X
l=0
r! (m  r   1)!
m!
l! (pj   l   1)!
pj !
dirl;
where mj (S) = fk 2Mnj=Pk  Sg and dirl is the number of compatible swings
with P; (S; S [ i) ; for a player i 2 Pj in (N; v; P ), such that jmj (S)j = r and
jS \ Pj j = l: Then, for any value of r between 0 and m  1 and, any value of l
between 0 and pj   1;
dirl =
k=q 1X
k=q wi
aikrl;
where aikrl is the number of compatible swings with P; (S; S [ i) ; for a player
i 2 Pj ; such that w (S) = k; jmj (S)j = r and jS \ Pj j = l.
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Theorem 3 Let (N; v; P ) be a weighted majority game with an a priori system
of unions, with v = [q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn] and P = fP1; P2; : : : ; Pmg. The gen-
erating function of the numbers

aikrl
	
k0;r0;l0 for a player i 2 N is given
by:
Si (x; t; z) =
mY
r=1;r 6=j

1 + xw(Pr)t
 pjY
l=1;jl 6=i
(1 + xwjl z)
where w (Pr) =
P
j2Pr
wj and Pj =

j1; j2; :::; jpj
	
:
Proof. Let us take a game (N; v; P ) 2 SU (N) ; with v = [q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn]
and a player i 2 Pj : We consider the function:
1 + xw(P1)t

: : :

1 + xw(Pj 1)t

1 + xw(Pj+1)t

: : :

1 + xw(Pm)t

(1 + xwj1 z) : : :
: : :
 
1 + x
wjpj z

= 1 +
X
S2C(j;P )
Y
r2mj(S)

xw(Pr)t
 Y
k2S\Pj
(xwkz) =
1 +
X
S2C(j;P )
x
P
k2S wktjmj(S)jzjS\Pj j = 1 +
X
S2C(j;P )
xw(S)tjmj(S)jzjS\Pj j:
Grouping exponents of the same order and taking k = w (S), the previous
function is equal to:
w(N)X
k=0
m 1X
r=0
pjX
l=0
akrlx
ktrzl
where a000 = 1 and akrl; where at least one of the indices k; r or l is greater
than 0; is the number of compatible coalitions with P; S; for a player i 2
Pj with w (S) = k; mj (S) = r and jS \ Pj j = l. To compute the numbers
aikrl
	
k0;r0;l0, it is su¢ cient to drop the factor (1 + x
wi) :
The previous result gives a method to compute

aikrl
	
k0;r0;l0. Now, it
is necessary to obtain the values dirl; that can be identied by the coe¢ cients of
gi (t; z) =
m 1X
r=0
pj 1X
l=0
dirlt
rzl;
and, taking into account that dirl =
q 1P
k=q wi
aikrl; it holds that :
gi (t; z) =
m 1X
r=0
pj 1X
l=0
dirlz
ltr =
m 1X
r=0
pj 1X
l=0
24 q 1X
k=q wi
aikrl
35 trzl:
By the previous result:
Si (x; t; z) =
m 1X
r=0
pj 1X
l=0
24w(N) wiX
k=0
aikrlx
k
35 trzl:
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The coe¢ cients of gi (t; z) can be computed, selecting for each pair of exponents
of variables z and t in Si (x; t; z) ; the coe¢ cients of those terms xktrzl such that
k takes values between q   wi and q   1:2
3.4 A simple example
The Parliament of the Balearic Islands, one of the Spain seventeen autonomous
communities, is made up of 59 members. Following elections on 13 June, 1999,
the Parliament was composed of 28 members of the conservative party PP, 16
members of the socialist party PSOE, 5 members of the socialist regional party
PSM-EN, 4 members of EU-EV, a coalition of communist and other left-wing
parties, 3 members of the middle-of-the-road regional party UM, and 3 members
of PROG, a coalition of progressive parties that presented candidature only on
some island. Analyzing this Parliament as a weighted majority game, the quota
is 30 and it can be represented as [30; 28; 16; 5; 4; 3; 3] :
3.4.1 How does it work ? The simple Banzhaf case
To understand how the generating function works, lets consider rst that there
is no a priori union and compute the Banzhaf index of player two. Let BZ(x)
be the generating function for the game. We have :
BZ(x) = (1 + x28)(1 + x16)(1 + x5)(1 + x4)(1 + x3)(1 + x3):
As we can see, each of the exponents of the variable x corresponds to the
voting weights associated to a given player. In order to get the generating
function relevant for player two, say BZ2(x), we drop the factor corresponding
to this player, that is (1 + x16) :
BZ2(x) = (1 + x
28)(1 + x5)(1 + x4)(1 + x3)(1 + x3):
The next step is to expand the polynomial :
BZ2(x) = (1 + x
28)(1 + x5)(1 + x4)(1 + x3)(1 + x3)
= 2x3 + x4 + x5 + x6 + 2x7 + 2x8 + x9 + x10 + x11
+2x12 + x15 + x28 + 2x31 + x32 + x33 + x34 + 2x35
+2x36 + x37 + x38 + x39 + 2x40 + x43 + 1:
2The results presented in this section can be extended for (hierarchical) level structures
(Winter, 1989) in a straightforward way. A level structure is a nite sequence of partitions
B = (B1; B2; :::; Bm) such that if S  Bi, then S  T for some T 2 Bi+1: For a two-levels
structure, the generating function of the Owen Index might for instance be written as :
Ri (x; t; z; y) =
Qu
l=1;l6=k
 
1 + xw(Ul)y
Qml
r=1;r 6=j
 
1 + xw(Plr)t
Qpj
k=1;jk 6=i
 
1 + xwjk z

where U = fU1; U2; :::; Uug and Ul = fPl1; Pl2; :::; Plmlg represents a partition of the set
of all the partitions of the set of players. We thank Eyal Winter for having pointed out this
possible generalization.
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We are now able to understand the "trick" underlying the use of generat-
ing functions. The property of the power function, which can transform the
multiplication of a given variable into a sum of di¤erent exponents, is used to
recollect the sum of the weights of a given coalition. For instance, if player four
(represented by the monom x4 because she has 4 voting rights) forms a coalition
with player six (represented by the monom x3), the total weight of the coalition
can be read in the exponent of x4 x3 = x4+3 = x7: Recollecting all the monoms
with the same exponents allows to get the number of coalitions with the same
weight. For example, 2x7 can be read as: there are two coalitions whose weight
is equal to seven (player ve with player six and player four with player seven).
We are now able to count the number of coalitions for which player two is
pivotal. This will be the case whenever the coalitions formed before her arrival
have a weight above 14 and below 29. There are only two of them: one whose
total weight is equal to 15 (represented by x15), and another whose total weight
is equal to 28 (represented by x28). Given that the total number of possible
coalitions without player two is equal to 25 = 32; the (non-normalized) BZ
index of player two is 1=16:
3.4.2 How does it work ? The a priori union cases
We may presume the existence of agreements among the left-wing parties. More-
over, from the regionalist opinions of PSM-EN and UM we may assume that
both parties will form a union. We consider the following system of unions:
P = ffPPg ; fPSOE;EU   EV;PROGg ; fPSM   EN;UMgg ;
where P1 has 28 seats, P2 has 23 seats and P3 has 8 seats.
A1. BO index of player 4. We take the function:
B4 (x) =
 
1 + x28
  
1 + x8
  
1 + x16
  
1 + x3

=
x55 + x52 + x47 + x44 + x39 + x36 + x31 + x28 + x27+
x24 + x19 + x16 + x11 + x8 + x3 + 1:
Then, we obtain 4 (v) =
P29
k=26 b
4
k = 2: In a similar way, it holds that
1 (v) = 3 (v) = 4 (v) = 5 (v) = 6 (v) = 2.
The BO index is: 	(N; v; P ) = (1=2; 1=8; 1=4; 1=8; 1=4; 1=8) :
A2. SCB index of player 3. We take the function:
S3 (x; z) =
 
1 + x28
  
1 + x23
  
1 + x3z

=
x54z + x31z + x26z + x3z + x51 + x28 + x23 + 1:
We choose the coe¢ cients of terms xkzj such that k takes values between
25 and 29 (x26z and x28); then
g3 (z) =
1X
j=0
d3jz
j = z + 1;
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and the SCB index of player 3 is equal to:
3 (N; v; P ) =
1
22
1X
j=0
j! (2  j   1)!
2!
d3j =
1
4
1!0!
2!
1 +
1
4
0!1!
2!
1 =
1
4
:
The SCB index is: (N; v; P ) = (1=2; 1=6; 1=4; 1=6; 1=4; 1=6) :
A3. OW index of player 6: We take the function:
S6 (x; t; z) =
 
1 + x28t
  
1 + x8t
  
1 + x16z
  
1 + x4z

=
x56tz2 + x48tz2 + x28tz2 + x20z2 + x52tz + x44tz + x40tz+
x32tz + x24tz + x12tz + x16z + x4z + x36t+ x28t+ x8t+ 1:
We choose the coe¢ cients of terms xktrzl such that the exponent k takes
values between 27 and 29 (x28tz2 and x28t); then
g6 (t; z) =
2X
r=0
2X
l=0
dirlt
rzl = tz2 + t;
and the OW index of player 6 is equal to:
6 (N; v; P ) =
2X
r=0
2X
l=0
r! (m  r   1)!
m!
l! (pj   l   1)!
pj !
dirl =
1!1!
3!
0!2!
3!
1 +
1!1!
3!
2!0!
3!
1 =
1
9
:
The OW index is:  (N; v; P ) = (1=3; 1=9; 1=6; 1=9; 1=6; 1=9) :
In general, however, games with a large number of players will not allow
to get these indices by hand, and the use of a computer is required. This
is the procedure that we used in the following application to the IMF. This
aims at illustrating the di¤erence in behavior of the coalitional power indices.
The procedure has been programmed under the Mathematica system, using a
modication of codes written by Tannenbaum (1997) and Bilbao (2000).3 The
results di¤er from the previous research on the topic presented in this journal
(Leech, 2002).
3We are happy to make our Mathematica codes available upon request.
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4 An application to the IMF
Besides the analysis of parliamentary systems, power indices were widely ap-
plied to international organizations, such as the UN Security Council (Shapley
and Shubik, 1954), the European Union (Widgren, 1994), the European Cen-
tral Bank (Brückner, 2000) or the International Monetary Funds (Dreyer and
Schotter, 1980; Schmidtchen (2001a), Schmidtchen (2001b) and Leech, 2002). It
turns out that the case of IMF is a particularly good example of the limitations
that were imposed on this kind of analysis. This is due to the fact that the tools
we provide in this paper were missing.
4.1 IMF a priori unions
According to its statutes, decision making at IMF is supposed to be made
with respect to a weighted majority rule, using a majority requirement that is
varying depending on the importance of the decision to be taken (50%, 70%
or 85%). Nevertheless, instead of allowing the whole set of possible coalitions,
IMF Article of Agreements imposed the following restrictions on the cooperation
structure. First, the 184 members states have to meet by groups of countries,
the so-called constituencies, in order to choose an Executive Director who will
represent them at the Executive Board. Then, the 24 Executive Directors vote
according to a weighted majority rule, each of them casting the total of the
votes of the constituency they represent (without having the right to split the
voting rights they cast). As a result, the set of feasible coalitions is restricted
to happen by a priori blocs of countries. Such a restriction on the set of allowed
coalitions obviously comes from the willingness to ease everyday life decision
making4 .
This mechanism design calls for the analysis to be carried out for a two-level
bargaining process. As stressed by Leech (2002):
Given the existence of the constituencies around the election of
executive directors, it might be considered appropriate [...] to model
the power relationships [...] in terms of a two-stage process: rst,
members use their weighted votes within their group to elect a di-
rector; second, their elected director casts their combined votes as a
bloc in the Executive Board. [...] This two-stage approach, however,
has not been pursued here since it would require the existence of
the constituencies to be xed independently of the outcome of the
rst stage, which cannot be assumed under the rules. [...] It is an
interesting topic that is not considered here and remains for future
works.
Leech did not follow further his reasoning because he was much more think-
ing about the so-called v-composition of games (see Owen, 1995). Here, such a
4And this is indeed the case, as the power of the collectivity to act (as dened in Coleman,
1971) is increased from 8.25393E-06 without this restriction to 7.17461E-04 with it (using a
85% majority requirement).
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composition does not work well as it would indeed assign a zero power to coun-
tries pertaining to a constituency where some members have more than half of
the total of votes within it (Italy or Brazil for instance). In fact, the denition
of the constituencies (that is, the identication of the countries that pertain to
a given constituency) does not result itself from IMF Articles of Agreements,
but from an informal bargaining process among members. It is obviously hard
to believe that a member state will accept to give its voting rights to such a
dominant country, knowing that the Executive Director of the constituency is
going to decide without taking into account its opinion. The former would in-
stead prefer to join another constituency without such a dominant country. The
a priori union framework takes into account this implicit power due to the ex-
istence of an outside option. It assumes that the allocation of power within a
constituency is proportional to the voting rights the country adds to the union
he joins, the proportionality factor depending on the index used.5 As a result,
it ts better to the particular information we have on the existing coalition
structure.
In what follows, we provide the BO, the SCB and the OW indices using the
IMF voting rights as well as the a priori union structure for September 2002.6
For comparison purposes, we also provide two kind of indices. The rst are the
traditional BZ and SH indices using the set of weights of the quotient game.
This game is dened for 24 players, where each player is an Executive Director
endowed with the total of votes of the countries who elected him. The second
are the BZ and SH indices using the set of weights given by the voting rights of
the 184 members states without any a priori union structure (better said, with
the trivial one where each country votes as a single entity). Hence, the rst
kind of indices analyzes the Executive Board weighted majority game without
being able to decompose the voting rights within each constituency, while the
second kind of indices analyzes the Governors Board weighted majority game,
the Governor Board being a di¤erent committee whose size makes it unable to
be involved in everyday life IMF decision-making. The indices are computed
for the three majority requirements, and presented in their normalized form
(e.g. divided so that the totals sum up to one). It has to be stressed that the
generating function method allowed us to compute these indices for a large set
of players without having to use any approximation method.
4.2 Comparison of the indices
As can be seen in table 1, the indices di¤er whenever they are computed with or
without an a priori union framework. The di¤erences become very sensitive to
the majority requirement. For instance, the Banzhaf-type of power (using the
85% majority requirement) of the actor with the higher weight, namely United
States, is roughly divided by two when it is measured without a priori unions.
5We have received a conrmation of the legitimacy of the a priori union approach, com-
pared to the v-composition one, from private conversations with anonymous o¢ cials that were
involved in the IMF decision-making process.
6Both can be found on the IMF website : http://www.imf.org.
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If the decision lies within the Board of Governor, power is accurately measured
by standard power analysis. But when the decision lies within the Executive
Board, the coalitional power indices may provide a more relevant measure.
[Insert Table 1 here]
4.2.1 Comparison with the indices without a priori unions
One can also compare the behavior of the indices computed with a priori unions
to the behavior of the indices computed without a priori unions but using the set
of weights of the quotient game (Table 2). It is quite appealing to see that, in this
case, the union-sums of the power indices are roughly equal to the traditional
BZ and SH indices computed on the quotient game. In fact, for the SCB and
OW case, the di¤erences are only due to roundings made on the set of weights
used in the computation7 but they should be regarded as equal to the BZ and
SH (respectively) computed on the quotient game. Hence, the behavior of the
two former indices reproduces the feature of the BZ and SH indices, but adds
information to the analysis because it is now possible to disaggregate the value
at the individual level. For instance, if the SH index roughly yields 4.3 percent
of power to the constituency containing Spain and Venezuela, we are now able
to say, looking at the OW index, that these countries respectively exert 1.4 and
1.2 percent of the power from an individual point of view.
[Insert Table 2 here]
4.2.2 Modifying the cooperation structure without changing the set
of weights
Interestingly, the a priori union framework also allows us to analyze what would
be the member states power in another coalition structure which would not
a¤ect the distribution of individual voting rights. Assume for instance that Eu-
ropean states were to form a European constituency, a question that is actually
under debate and that Benassy-Queré and Bowles (2004) analyze in more de-
tails in a separate paper. Would such an a priori union increase or decrease the
power of European Union as a whole with respect to, say, the United States ?
7 IMF voting rights are obtained by giving 250 basic votes plus one voting right for each 100
000 SDR quota a member states has. When expressed in percentage form, nothing prevents
the voting weights of member states from being irrational numbers. In order to get integer
weights (needed by the use of the generating function method) while keeping a two-digits
precision, we multiplied all the weights by 100 in the case of BO and SCB, BZ indices (10
for the OW and SH indices because their computation was more time-consuming). Within
the a priori union framework, the rounding is made on an individual basis while it is made
on an aggregate basis when the BZ and SH are computed. This, together with the impact
of the rounding on the majority requirement, explains entirely the di¤erences. It should be
mentioned that the very small di¤erences in voting weights between small countries diminish
by rounding.
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The BZ and SH indices cannot help us in addressing the question: they will
remain unchanged as far as the voting rights will not change. Conversely, the
BO, SCB and OW indices change. The striking feature is that this yields to
an increased power of the United States under the 85% majority requirement,
while the aggregate power of European Union decreases, while the opposite
result holds under the 50% majority requirement. On the other hand, small
countries or constituencies are likely to benet from the European consituencies
under the 85% majority threshold, indicating that the unication may o¤er a
scope for a better representation of developping countries.
Without detailing the whole set of results, we provide part of them as they
also shed light on the behavior of the three former indices when the coalition
structure is to be changed (please see Table 3). Indeed, this a priori conguration
rst illustrates the importance of the symmetry in the quotient game property.
While the union-sum of the OW and SCB indices still roughly correspond to the
SH and BZ indices computed on the quotient game (whose weights changed),
the BO index exhibits huge di¤erences. First, the higher the majority require-
ment, the higher the di¤erence. Second, this di¤erence seems to introduce a
bias between single-player unions and multiple-players unions, which negatively
a¤ects multiple players unions when the majority requirement is high.
[Insert Table 3 here]
How should we account for these di¤erences between BO and SCB ? They
are obviously due to the combination of three e¤ects. The rst one comes from
a characteristic feature of the Banzhaf-type measure of power, which becomes
less and less e¢ cient when the majority requirement increases. This is roughly
because the cardinality of the set of swings is decreasing in the latter. The
second e¤ect is due to the way the surplus is allocated within unions. BO still
use a Banzhaf-type allocation, while SCB use an e¢ cient one. As a result, the
non-normalized SCB index of a given player will always be weakly above the
BO one (the equality holding whenever a player is single in her union). Finally,
the normalization of the indices introduces a third e¤ect: the weak inequality is
transformed into a strict one for multiple-players unions, as long as the a priori
union structure is not the trivial one.
4.2.3 Sensitivity of the indices to a variation in the majority require-
ment
The following graphs illustrate the sensitivity of the indices to a variation of
the majority requirement. Using the current set of weights and a priori union
structure, we computed the three indices for majority requirements ranging from
50% to 100%.8 BO and SCB roughly reproduce the behavior of the Banzhaf
8These graphs can be compared to the ones provided by Leech (1998) for the approximated
BZ and SH indices computed for the quotient game only.
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index when the sequence of games tends to the unanimity game, while Owen
index reproduces the SH one. The power of the large state measured by BO
and SCB quickly decreases, while it remains still high under the OW index as
long as the player is still above the veto threshold (85%).
[Insert Graphs 1,2 and 3 here]
5 Concluding Remarks
We believe that the procedures presented in this paper can be helpful in shed-
ding some light on the theoretical work on the comparison and properties of the
existing power measures. The analysis of the principles of dominance, transfer
and bloc done by Felsenthal and Machover (1995) for several power measures
could be extended to the BO, OW and SCB indices using the numerical re-
sults based on the generating function approach. Turning now to monotonicity
properties, the numerical analysis can show that the three indices may for in-
stance exhibit violations of the local monotonicity criteria proposed by Holler
and Napel (2003)9 . The presentation of a detailed set of numerical results al-
lowing this kind of analysis was beyond the scope of this paper. A large set of
such numerical results based on our procedures can be found in Benassy-Queré
and Bowles (2004).
Besides this challenging analysis, another interest of the procedures pro-
posed here is that they provide practical tools for decision-makers. Indeed, our
approach gives at hand a method to compare the value of constituencies for
newcomers and to evaluate the power implications of their choice. For instance,
the creation of a European Seat at the International Monetary Fund is cur-
rently under discussion among several European administrations. First of all, it
is not completely clear whether such a seat may increase or decrease the power
of the European Union as a whole. Second, the net impact on the European
Union power may hide variations in the relative power of the European coun-
tries within the European constituency. Obviously, the results presented here
are unrealistic because the United States, whose agreement is needed to change
IMF statutes, will never accept to face a European Representative having the
highest voting rights among the IMF members. As evidenced in Benassy-Queré
and Bowles (2002), the most likely implementation of the European Seat would
rank the EU slightly below the US in terms of voting rights10 . Nevertheless,
9We thank Manfred Holler and Stefan Napel for having pointed out these violations. These
results are available upon request.
10The "trick" allowing this would consist in consolidating the European nancial accounts in
order to get the voting rights of the new european entity slightly below the United States ones.
Indeed, these voting rights are based on economic and nancial variables. The extraction of
intra-european trade and nancial ows in the computation of the voting rights may allow a
situation in which the voting rights of the EU as a whole are much lower than the sum of the
voting rights of the EU countries.
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the application of our procedures to a set of more realistic scenarii can be found
in the aforementioned paper. It is worth pointing out that this work has been
done upon request of European o¢ cials involved in the issue11 .
There is, as always, no free lunch. What makes the interest of our decision-
toolkit is also responsible for its limitations. First of all, the simplicity of the
cooperative approach has an obvious shortcoming in that it does not allow for
an equilibrium-based approach. As pointed by an anomymous referee, it is
possible that no set of constituencies is in equilibrium in the sense that there
may always be countries that can benet from switching constituencies. For
instance, the creation of a European constituency may induce a modication of
the perimeter of the other existing constituencies. This may cancel the potential
benets of the EU Seat12 . The analysis of the existence and unicity of such an
equilibrium would require a more complicated non-cooperative approach that,
according to our knowledge, has not been yet developped.
In the same vein, our approach adopted a highly stylized view on the real
bargaining process. For instance, the cooperative formalization of the game is
purely static, while the real decision-making is intrinsically dynamic and deni-
tively more complex. There is for example a temporal discrepancy between the
frequency of the constituencies formations (taking place every two years), and
the frequency of the Executive Board meetings (once a week). This temporal dis-
crepancy deserves extensive analysis. The constituenciescomposition is rather
static, i.e., what we called "the outside option" (joining another constituency)
is an only very seldom realised option. Once a constituency is formed and its
Executive Director elected, it may indeed happen that the former ignores the
interests of some member of his/her constituency at some point in time. In this
case, the "outside option" cannot be immediately exerted. It will in reality not
even be exerted at all if the Executive Director tries to compensate this member
later on about a di¤erent issue, before the constituencies renegotiation takes
place. Hence the static allocation of rewards given by the indices only captures
some kind of (discounted) average of the benets associated to the participa-
tion to a given bloc. Some informal arrangements may emerge to ensure that
the representation of all the countries from a given constituency be fair in the
long-run. The nordic countries, for instance, have adopted a rotating scheme.
But this kind of informal arrangements are not and cannot be modelled by a
cooperative approach. We can only hope that they result in the same allocation
than the one derived from the static and highly stylized view.
Finally, the three indices presented here have the same drawbacks as the
classical power indices based on the use of a uniform distribution. All possible
coalitions (restricted by a priori unions) are not equally likely and may depend,
like the constituenciescomposition, on regional, historical and geostrategic as-
pects. A modication of these a priori measures taking into account informa-
tions like ideological or economical proximities similar to the spatial measures
proposed by Shapley (1977) for the classical power indices may be interest-
11This request is indeed the initial motivation prevailing the writing of this paper.
12Examples of the potential dynamic e¤ects induced by the merging of some players are
quoted in Stra¢ n (1994).
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ing. Similarly, other issue-specic alliances like in Schmidtchen (2001a) and
Schmidtchen (2003) may prove useful in reecting the real bloc building. As
all the decision-toolkits, our approach makes simplifying assumptions providing
some insights about complicated problems but is far from exhausting the eld.
We would even be happy to nd out that the research eld is now a bit larger
than before.
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Country Sept. 2002 q=50 q=85 q=50 q=85 q=50 q=85 q=50 q=85 q=50 q=85
United States 17.1 21.6 6.5 21.6 6.5 20.1 19.7 24.7 3.2 20.6 19.2
Japan 6.1 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.8 6.1 6.2 5.5 3.2 6.2 6.5
Germany 6.0 5.7 5.8 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.1 5.4 3.2 6.1 6.4
France 5.0 4.7 5.3 4.7 5.3 5.0 5.1 4.5 3.2 4.9 5.1
United Kingdom 5.0 4.7 5.3 4.7 5.3 5.0 5.1 4.5 3.2 4.9 5.1
Austria 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.4 0.9 0.9
Belarus 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2
Belgium 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.7 2.1 2.1
Czech Republic 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4
Hungary 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.5
Kazakhstan 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2
Luxembourg 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Slovak Republic 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2
Slovenia 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Turkey 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.5
Armenia 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Bosnia and Herz. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Bulgaria 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3
Croatia 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2
Cyprus 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Georgia 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Israel 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.4
Macedonia, former 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Moldova 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Netherlands 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.8 2.4 2.4
Romania 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.5
Ukraine 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.6
Costa Rica 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
El Salvador 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Guatemala 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Honduras 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Mexico 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.8 1.2 1.2
Nicaragua 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Spain 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.3 2.1 1.4 1.4
Venezuela 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.8 1.2 1.2
Albania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Greece 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4
Italy 3.3 3.1 3.7 3.1 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.3
Malta 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Portugal 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.4
San Marino 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Antigua and Bar. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bahamas, The 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Barbados 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Belize 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Canada 2.9 2.8 3.1 2.8 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.7 3.0 2.9 2.9
Dominica 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Grenada 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ireland 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4
Jamaica 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
St. Lucia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
St. Vincent 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Denmark 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 1.2 0.8 0.8
Estonia 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Finland 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.6
Iceland 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Latvia 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Lithuania 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Norway 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 1.2 0.8 0.8
Sweden 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.7 1.1 1.1
 Voting Rights 
Nota bene : the difference in shading aims to indicate the participation to the same Constituency
Banzhaf Shapley-ShubikBanzhaf-Owen
Symmetric 
Coalitional 
Banzhaf
Owen
Coalitional Power Indices Classical Power Indices
Table 1. Voting Power at the IMF for selected countries
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1 Appendix : Computational Complexity, Al-
gorithms and Mathematica Code
In this appendix, we provide some results about the complexity of the procedures
used, which basically show that the indices can be computed in polynomial
time. The following two subsections respectively present the algorithms and an
example of programming under the Mathematica system.
1.1 Computational Complexity
We rst start with a traditional denition in computational complexity theory:
Denition 1 Let f : Z+ ! Z+: and g : Z+ ! Z+:We say that f(n) = O(g(n))
if there exist C; n0 such that f(n) < Cg(n) for each n > n0
Hence, informally, f(n) = O(g(n)) means that f does not grow at a faster
rate than g: Computational complexity is dened as the cost f(n) , expressed
in time, when the input size is n: When f(n) is O(n2); the computational
complexity is quadratic in the measure of the input size. As recalled by Bilbao
(2000), polynomial complexity is often viewed as a desirable property from the
computational point of view.
Proposition 1 Let (N; v; P ), with v = [q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn] a weighted majority
game with an a priori system of unions. The number C of nonzero coe¢ cients of
the polynomial B(j) (x) =
Qm
r=1;r 6=j
 
1 + xw(Pr)
Qpj
jl=1
(1 + xwjl ) ; where Pj =
j1; j2; :::; jpj
	
and w (Pr) =
P
j2Pr
wj is such that :
m+ pj + 1  C  min(2m+pj ; w(N) + 1)
Proof. Assume that wj1 = wj2 = ::: = wpj = w and that w (Pr) = w for
each r 6= j The number of nonzero coe¢ cients of the polynomial :
(1 + xw)m+pj
will always be below the number of nonzero coe¢ cients ofQm
r=1;r 6=j
 
1 + xw(Pr)
Qpj
jl=1
(1 + xwjl ) for any set of weights.
Notice from before that
Qm
r=1;r 6=j
 
1 + xw(Pr)
Qpj
jl=1
(1 + xwjl ) =
Pw(N)
k=0 bkx
k
is a polynomial whose power is at most w(N): From what we have C  w(N)+1:
Moreover, when the powers of the polynomial are all di¤erent, C is equal to the
number of subsets of N compatible with P; that is 2m+pj :
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Proposition 2 Let (N; v; P ), with v = [q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn] a weighted major-
ity game with an a priori system of unions. The expansion of the polynomial
B(j) (x) =
Qm
r=1;r 6=j
 
1 + xw(Pr)
Qpj
jl=1
(1 + xwjl ) ; where Pj =

j1; j2; :::; jpj
	
and w (Pr) =
P
j2Pr
wj requires a time O(nC), where C is the number of nonzero
coe¢ cients of the polynomial B(j) (x) :
Proof. The function B(j)(x) can be computed by two successive loops :
B(j)(x) 1
for r 2 f1; :::;mg with r 6= j do
B(j)(x) B(j)(x) +B(j)(x)xw(Pr)
endfor
for jl 2

j1; j2; :::; jpj
	
do
B(j)(x) B(j)(x) +B(j)(x)xwjl
endfor
The time to compute the line in one loop is O(C): This line is computed
pj +m   1 times, so that the time to compute this function is O((m + pj)C):
The worst case happens when m = n   pj ; for which the computation time is
O(nC):
Iterating the procedure for the n players yields the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Let (N; v; P ), with v = [q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn] a weighted majority
game with an a priori system of unions. If C is the number of nonzero coef-
cients of B(j) (x) where j is such that pj 2 Maxfp1; p2; :::; prg = p the time
complexity of the generating algorithm for the Banzhaf-Owen indices is O(n2C):
In the same way, we have the following propositions (the proofs are similar
to those of the preceding propositions and corollary and are therefore omitted).
Considering rst the SCB index, we have:
Proposition 3 Let (N; v; P ), with v = [q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn] a weighted majority
game with an a priori system of unions. The number C of nonzero coe¢ cients of
the polynomial S(j) (x) =
Qm
r=1;r 6=j
 
1 + xw(Pr)
Qpj
jl=1
(1 + xwjl z) ; where Pj =
j1; j2; :::; jpj
	
and w (Pr) =
P
j2Pr
wj is such that :
m+ pj + 1  C  min(2m+pj ; pjw(N) + 1)
We also have :
Proposition 4 Let (N; v; P ), with v = [q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn] a weighted major-
ity game with an a priori system of unions. The expansion of the polynomial
S(j) (x; z) =
Qm
r=1;r 6=j
 
1 + xw(Pr)
Qpj
jl=1
(1 + xwjl z) ; where Pj =

j1; j2; :::; jpj
	
and w (Pr) =
P
j2Pr
wj requires a time O(nC), where C is the number of nonzero
coe¢ cients of the polynomial S(j) (x) :
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From which we can deduce:
Corollary 2 Let (N; v; P ), with v = [q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn] a weighted majority
game with an a priori system of unions. If C is the number of nonzero coe¢ -
cients of S(j) (x; z) where j is such that pj 2 Maxfp1; p2; :::; prg = p the time
complexity of the generating algorithm for the Symmetric Coalitional Banzhaf
indices is O(n2C):
With regard to the computational complexity of the OW index, the following
propositions and corollary hold. The rst deals with the complexity bounds:
Proposition 5 Let (N; v; P ), with v = [q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn] a weighted majority
game with an a priori system of unions. The number C of nonzero coe¢ cients of
the polynomial S(j) (x; z; t) =
Qm
r=1;r 6=j
 
1 + xw(Pr)t
Qpj
jl=1
(1 + xwjl z) ; where
Pj =

j1; j2; :::; jpj
	
and w (Pr) =
P
j2Pr
wj is such that :
m+ pj + 1  C  min(2m+pj ; pj(m  1)w(N) + 1)
The second deals with the complexity order:
Proposition 6 Let (N; v; P ), with v = [q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn] a weighted ma-
jority game with an a priori system of unions. The expansion of the poly-
nomial S(j) (x; z; t) =
Qm
r=1;r 6=j
 
1 + xw(Pr)t
Qpj
jl=1
(1 + xwjl z) ; where Pj =
j1; j2; :::; jpj
	
and w (Pr) =
P
j2Pr
wj requires a time O(nC), where C is the
number of nonzero coe¢ cients of the polynomial S(j) (x; z; t) :
From which we can deduce:
Corollary 3 Let (N; v; P ), with v = [q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn] a weighted majority
game with an a priori system of unions. If C is the number of nonzero coe¢ -
cients of S(j) (x; z; t) where j is such that pj 2Maxfp1; p2; :::; prg = p the time
complexity of the generating algorithm for the Owen indices O(n2C):
1.2 Algorithms
In this subsection, we present algorithms for the computation of the three coali-
tional power indices.
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1.2.1 Banzhaf-Owen index
Algorithm BanzhafOwen (ffw1; w2; :::; wp1g; :::; fw1;w2; ; :::; wpmgg; q)
m #ffw1;w2; :::; wkg; :::; fwl;wl+1; ; :::; wngg
for r 2 f1; :::;mg do
w(Pr) 
P
j2Pr
wj
endfor r
for r 2 f1; :::;mg do
l #Pr
sr(x) 
mQ
k=1;k 6=r
(1 + xw(Pk))
for i 2 f1; :::; lg do
s0i(x) 
lQ
t=1;t6=i
(1 + xwt)
Bi(x) sr(x) s0i(x)(
Bi(x) =
w(Nni)P
k=0
bikx
k
)
i  
q 1P
k=q wi
bik
	i  i
2m+l 2
endfor i
endfor r
output f	1; :::;	ng
1.2.2 Symmetric coalitional Banzhaf index
Algorithm SCBanzhaf (ffw1; w2; :::; wp1g; :::; fw1;w2; ; :::; wpmgg; q)
m #ffw1;w2; :::; wkg; :::; fwl;wl+1; ; :::; wngg
for r 2 f1; :::;mg do
w(Pr) 
P
j2Pr
wj
endfor r
for j 2 f1; :::;mg do
pj  #Pj
sr(x) 
mQ
k=1;k 6=r
(1 + xw(Pk))
for i 2 f1; :::; pjg do
s0i(x; z) 
pjQ
t=1;t6=i
(1 + zxwt)
Si(x; z) sr(x) s0i(x; z)
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(
Si(x; z) =
pj 1P
l=0
"
w(N) wiP
k=0
aiklx
k
#
zl
)
gi(z) 
pj 1P
l=0
dilz
l(
gi(z) =
pj 1P
l=0
"
q 1P
k=q wi
aikl
#
zl =
pj 1P
l=0
dilz
l
)
i  
pj 1P
l=0
1
2m 1
l!(pj   l   1)!
pj !
dil
endfor i
endfor j
output f1; :::;ng
1.2.3 Owen index
Algorithm Owenindex (ffw1; w2; :::; wp1g; :::; fw1;w2; ; :::; wpmgg; q)
m #ffw1;w2; :::; wkg; :::; fwl;wl+1; ; :::; wngg
for r 2 f1; :::;mg do
w(Pr) 
P
j2Pr
wj
endfor r
for j 2 f1; :::;mg do
pj  #Pj
sr(x; t) 
mQ
k=1;k 6=r
(1 + xw(Pk)t)
for i 2 f1; :::; pjg do
s0i(x; z) 
pjQ
t=1;t6=i
(1 + zxwt)
Si(x; z; t) sr(x; t) s0i(x; z)(
Si(x; z; t) =
m 1P
r=0
pj 1P
l=0
"
w(N) wiP
k=0
aiklrx
k
#
trzl
)
gi(z; t) 
m 1P
r=0
pj 1P
l=0
dirlt
rzl(
gi(z) =
m 1P
r=0
pj 1P
l=0
"
q 1P
k=q wi
aiklr
#
 zl =
m 1P
r=0
pj 1P
l=0
dirlz
ltr
)
i  
m 1P
r=0
pj 1P
l=0
r!(m  r   1)!
m!
l!(pj   l   1)!
pj !
dirl
endfor i
endfor j
output f1; :::;ng
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1.3 Mathematica Code
The Code is written for the Mathematica system and can be runned under the
version 3.01 . The functions Banzhafowen, Banzhafcs and Owenindex allows to
get the non-normalized indices. The syntax requires to enter a set of weights
and a majority requirement. The weights of the players pertaining to a given
coalition are regrouped into the same subset, and the set of weights used by the
functions is dened as the union of the a priori unions subsets. For instance,
the set of weights of the Parliament of Balearic Islands case has to be writ-
ten as {{28},{16,4,3},{4,3}} where {16,4,3} represents the a priori union
composed by player two, four and six.
The three algorithms are similar to those proposed by Tannenbaum (1997)
or Bilbao (2000) for the BZ and SH power indices and work as follows. The
variable m is assigned the number of existing a priori unions and the sum
of the weights of each union is stocked into a table called wp. Then, two
imbricated loops starts. The rst one expands the polynomial corresponding
to each union. The second one expands the polynomial of each player within
the given union. Then, the variable coe stores the set of coe¢ cients of the
generating function (using the function Coe¢ cientList). Among them, the
coe¢ cients corresponding to a pivotal case (between q wi and q 1) are stored
in the variable monom. Finally, the variable index is assigned the weighted
sum of these coe¢ cients, using the probability distribution corresponding to the
index under computation.
The example of the Parliament of Balearic Islands is provided together with
the code (input in bold, output in normal text).
1.3.1 Banzhaf-Owen index
The Mathematica Code for the Banzhaf-Owen index is:
Banzhafowen[weights_List,q_Integer]:=
Module[{m=Length[weights],wp,p,s,s1,s2,coe,monom,index},
wp=Table[Apply[Plus,weights[[r]]],{r,m}];Do[delun=Delete[wp,r];
s1=Times@@(1+x^delun);
Do[delplay=Delete[weights[[r]],i];
s2=Times @@(1+x^delplay);s=s1*s2;p=Length[weights[[r]]];
coe=Coe¢ cientList[s,x];
monom=
Apply[Plus, coe[[Range[Max[1,q-Extract[weights[[r]],i]+1],
Min[q,Length[coe]]]]]];
index[Sum[Length[weights[[h]]],{h,r-1}]+i]=monom/2^(p-1),
{i,Length[weights[[r]]]}],{r,m}];
Table[index[i],{i,Sum[Length[weights[[r]]],{r,m}]}]/2^(m-1)]
1Compatibility with previous versions will require to substitute wr=weights[[r]]; ...;
wr[[i]] for the function Extract[weights[[r]],i]
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Game={{28},{16,4,3},{4,3}}
{{28},{16,4,3},{4,3}}
Banzhafowen[Game,30]
{1/2, 1/8, 1/8, 1/8, 1/4, 1/4}
1.3.2 Symmetric Coalitional Banzhaf index
The Mathematica Code for the Symmetric Coalitional Banzhaf index is:
SCBanzhaf[weights_List,q_Integer]:=
Module[{m=Length[weights],wp,p,s,s1,s2,coe,monom,index},
wp=Table[Apply[Plus,weights[[r]]],{r,m}];
Do[delun=Delete[wp,r];s1=Times@@(1+x^delun);
Do[delplay=Delete[weights[[r]],i];
s2=Times @@(1+z*x^delplay);s=s1*s2;p=Length[weights[[r]]];
coe=Coe¢ cientList[s,x];
monom=Apply[Plus,
coe[[Range[Max[1,q-Extract[weights[[r]],i]+1],
Min[q,Length[coe]]]]]];
index[Sum[Length[weights[[h]]],{h,r-1}]+i]=
Sum[Coe¢ cient[monom,z,l]*l!(p-l-1)!/p!,{l,0,p-1}],{i,
Length[weights[[r]]]}],{r,m}];
Table[index[i],{i,Sum[Length[weights[[r]]],{r,m}]}]/2^(m-1)]
Game={{28},{16,4,3},{4,3}}
{{28},{16,4,3},{4,3}}
SCBanzhaf[Game,30]
{1/2, 1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/4, 1/4}
1.3.3 Owen index
The Mathematica Code for the Owen index is:
Owenindex[weights_List,q_Integer]:=
Module[{m=Length[weights],wp,p,s,s1,s2,coe,monom,index},
wp=Table[Apply[Plus,weights[[r]]],{r,m}];
Do[delun=Delete[wp,r];s1=Times@@(1+t*x^delun);
Do[delplay=Delete[weights[[r]],i];
s2=Times @@(1+z*x^delplay);s=s1*s2;p=Length[weights[[r]]];
coe=Coe¢ cientList[s,x];
monom=Apply[Plus,
coe[[Range[Max[1,q-Extract[weights[[r]],i]+1],
Min[q,Length[coe]]]]]];
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index[Sum[Length[weights[[h]]],{h,r-1}]+i]=
Sum[Coe¢ cient[Sum[Coe¢ cient[monom,z,l]*l!(p-l-1)!/p!,{l,0,p-1}],
t,k]*k!*(m-k-1)!,{k,0,m-1}],{i,Length[weights[[r]]]}],{r,m}];
Table[index[i],{i,Sum[Length[weights[[r]]],{r,m}]}]/m!]
Game={{28},{16,4,3},{4,3}}
{{28},{16,4,3},{4,3}}
Owenindex[Game,30]
{1/3, 1/9, 1/9, 1/9, 1/6, 1/6}
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The question of country representation in international institutions – and especially in the 
International Monetary Fund – constitutes a major issue in the reform of world governance. 
The IMF is goverened by two decision-making bodies: the Board of Governors, which brings 
together 184 representatives from member countries once per year; and the Executive Board, 
whose 24 Executive Directors take concrete decisions several times a week. Given the large 
number of Governors and the low frequency of their meetings, the role of the Board of 
Governors is largely formal. Hence, the Executive Board may be considered de facto as the 
main decision body of the IMF. 
Among the 24 Executive Directors, eight represent each a single country,1 whereas the 
remaining 16 are elected by country groups called constituencies. While there is little formal 
voting at the Executive Board, the relative power of the Directors depends on the voting rights 
they have been attibuted.  The voting rights of each Director corresponds to the voting right of 
the country or constituency he (she) represents, and the voting is based on qualified majorities 
(50%, 70% or 85%), depending on the importance of the decision to be made. 
One main concern about the governance of the IMF is the low share of voting rights attributed 
to developing countries. Indeed, the industrial countries hold 60% of the voting rights, the 
United States alone accounting for 17%. This is as much as the developing Asian countries 
and Latin America combined, and enough to block all decisions requiring an 85% majority. In 
fact, the voting rights are quasi proportional to the quotas of member countries at the IMF the 
latter being more dependent on their capacity to contribute to the Fund than on their needs. 
Following the Cooper proposal of 2000, there has been an intensive work to figure out a way 
to rebalance voting rights in favour of developing countries.2 The basic conclusion is that 
raising the voting rights of developing countries will hardly be possible without some 
disconnection between quotas and voting rights. This complicated and political topic was on 
the agenda of the twelfth general review of quotas, completed by the end of 2003, which did 
not result into a proposal for a quota change. Ad hoc quota increases for 54 member countries 
have been decided in 2008, which became effective as of March 2011 and enhance the 
representation of low income countries. Building on this, the Fourteenth General Quota 
review took place in 2010.  A Plan was adopted in November 2010 “to reflect the increasing 
                                                 
1
 The countries are China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
2
 The Cooper proposal and studies by the IMF on the  quota formulas are available at www.imf.org. 
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importance of emerging market and developing economies”,3 via a doubling of the quota and 
a proposed increase of 6 ppts of the quota share in favour of the so-called “dynamic emerging 
market and developing countries (EMDC). The plan, which was supposed to come into force 
by end 2012, is now pending the ratification of the US. A fifteenth General Quota Review is 
expected to be completed by January 2015. 
A parallel topic is the representation of the European Union in both the Board of Governors 
and the Executive Board. On the basis of current quotas, the enlarged EU will account for 
32% of the quotas, the present euro area alone standing at 23%. However the voting rights are 
distributed across constituencies where EU and non-EU countries are often mixed up. One 
topical question is whether grouping EU countries into a single representation, with possibly 
lower voting rights, could lead to higher voting power for the EU as a whole and for each 
member country. This is a very important question for the EU, which may feel its influence 
lower than that of the US at the IMF despite higher cumulated voting rights; it is also 
important for low developed and emerging countries which could be transferred the voting 
rights abandoned by the EU. 
A popular tool for studying voting power is provided by the cooperative game theory. Power 
indices are based on the ability of each player to move a losing coalition into a winning one 
by using its votes. Such approach has been applied to the United Nations Security Council 
(Shapley-Shubik, 1954), to the European Central Bank (Brückner, 1997) or to the EU Council 
(Barr and Passarelli, 2003). It has been applied to the IMF Board of Governors by Leech 
(2002) and by Bini Smaghi (2005). The former shows the relative power of member countries 
to be very dependent on the qualified majority used (50%, 70% or 85%): 
“The results show that, first (…), the effect of the special 85% supermajority requirement is to equalise 
voting power to a great extent. Second, the results for ordinary decisions using the 50% majority rule 
show that power is more unequally distributed than intended” (p. 388). 
It follows that the United States, which enjoys the largest voting right, should not ask for 
supermajority requirements. The intuition behind this result is that, although the United States 
alone has a veto power with the supermajority requirement, hence a high power to block a 
decision, this requirement also offers a wide range of possible coalitions to block a decision. 
Hence, the United States also displays a low power to initiate action with the supermajority 
requirement. More generally, the 50% requirement produces the most unequal distribution of 
                                                 
3
 IMF website: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm 
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voting powers (depending on the distribution of voting rights), whereas voting powers 
converge as the majority requirement rises; a unanimity requirement leads to equal voting 
power for all member countries whatever their voting rights. According to Leech (1998), the 
same would happen should the EU members vote as a block: they would enjoy a very high 
voting power (at the expense of the United States) with a 50% majority requirement, but this 
prominence would be erased for supermajority voting. Similar results are presented in Bini 
Smaghi (2005). 
This striking result, which is derived from the calculation of Banzhaf and Coleman power 
indices, applies to a single-stage game like that of the Board of Governors. The case of the 
Executive Board is complicated by the existence of constituencies.4 The latter reduce the 
number of players, from 188 (number of member countries) to 24 (number of Executive 
Directors) and provide some a priori information on the possible coalitions. Most Executive 
Directors are elected by a group of countries and must take into account the balance of 
opinions in their own constituency before they proceed to a vote. Hence one could think of the 
Executive Board as a two-stage game: for each decision, first there is a vote within each 
constituency, and then a quotient game at the Executive Board. However the constituencies 
are not fixed forever. Indeed, the Articles allow for a country to join another constituency 
when Executive Directors are elected. One consequence is that an Executive Director is 
obliged to account for the opinion of any country in his (her) constituency, since there is a risk 
that the latter leaves the constituency, reducing the voting rights he (she) is endorsed with. 
Another consequence is that a two-stage approach cannot be carried out since the outcome of 
the first stage (the vote within each constituency) may influence the definition of the first 
stage game itself (the number and nature of the players in each constituency).5 
In a related paper, Leech (1998) provides a comparison between the Banzhaf index of power 
(Banzhaf, 1985) and the Shapley-Shubik one (Shapley and Shubik, 1954). The former, a 
coalition is defined as a combination of any number of players with no specific order, whereas 
in the latter, each coalition corresponds to a specific ordering of all players, with one pivotal 
player in each combination. Although only the Shapley-Shubik index has been shown to 
satisfy desirable properties (for instance, the Banzhaf index must be re-normalised to sum to 
                                                 
4
 As a first approximation, Leech (1998) applies the same, single-stage methodology to the Executive Board as to the Board of 
Governors. Only the number of players and their voting rights is modified. But then, it is no longer possible to track the voting 
power of each member of a constituency, except if the voting power can be attributed to the country holding the Executive 
Directorship. 
5
 This point is noted by Leech (2002). 
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unity, but then it cannot be compared across games with different majority requirements), the 
Banzhaf index has generally be preferred by political scientists, perhaps due to easier 
computability. While both indices provide similar results for the 50% majority requirement, 
the Banzhaf indices of the various countries converge continuously when the majority 
threshold is raised (from 50% to 100%, see above), whereas the Shapley-Shubik indices 
converge only for very high threshold (70% or more). However the Banzhaf index displays 
non-linarities and high sensitiveness to the data. On the whole, it is difficult to assess which 
index is closer to the reality since no comprehensive image of reality is available. 
Alonso-Meijide and Bowles (2005) propose to study the balance of power at the Executive 
Board with the concept of a priori unions initiated by Owen (1977). In this framework, the 
power of each country in a given coalition is related to the threat it represents should it leave 
the coalition: this threat defines the amount of power the country should be rewarded with by 
the coalition. Alonso-Mejide and Bowles use three power indices: the Owen index, which is 
based on the Shapley-Shubik index corrected for a priori unions; the Banzhaf-Owen index, 
which is similar to the Owen index but relies on the Banzhaf index of power (see Alonso-
Meijide, 2002 for a derivation of this index), and the so-called Symmetric Coalitional Banzhaf 
index, where the allocation of power between unions is made according to a Banzhaf-type 
index, whereas it is made within unions according to a Shapley-type index (see Alonso-
Meijide and Fiestra-Janeiro, 2002).  The main advantage of the latter index is that it allows for 
symmetry between unions, ie the aggregate power of two constituencies entitled with equal 
voting rights is similar. This desirable property is obtained with the Owen index, but not with 
the Banzhaf-Owen one. Alonso-Meijide and Bowles (2005) provide “ready-to-use” 
procedures to compute these three indices for large numbers of players. They show the 
coalition power indices to be very sensitive to the coalition structure, ie, in our case, to the 
number and composition of constituencies. In particular, they find that aggregating the voting 
rights of EU countries would lead to a reduction in the voting power of Europe, even without 
any reduction in EU voting rights. The drop of EU power is more marked for the 85% 
threshold than for the 50% requirement, which can be related with the equalisation of voting 
powers when the threshold rises.  
The present paper draws on this methodology to study the possible impact of various 
scenarios concerning the representation of the European Union at the Executive Board. The 
originality of the paper lies both on the application of a priori union power indices and on the 
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definition of the scenarios for European representation, with a re-calculation of voting rights 
along the quota formulas in the case of single seat scenarios.  
The reform of quota decided in 2010 has not yet came into place, due to the refusal of the US 
to ratify the reform until now, and it is yet unclear whether those will be adopted or 
supplemented by a different proposal coming from the Fifteenth quota review. The 
computations presented in the paper have therefore been done of the basis of the pre-reform 
situation. In order to keep some comparability with previous studies, we decided to use the 
quota as they stood in mid-2003. For consistency reasons, the scenario investigated in the 
paper also refer to the situation existing at that time from the perspective of geographical 
coverage.6 While the EU and the Euro Area have experienced changes in their composition 
since that date, the relative size of the new member states only had a marginal impact on the 
variables looked at, meaning that the results obtained under these assumptions remain fairly 
representative of today’s situation.   
 
2. EUROPE’S REPRESENTATION AT THE IMF 
As already mentioned, voting rights at the IMF rely on quotas, the fixed part of voting rights 
being negligible for most countries.7 The countries belonging to the European Union before 
enlargement account for 30% of the quotas, and the thirteen new members (since May 20048) 
represent another 2%.9 Europe thus has a large weight in the decision bodies of the IMF. 
Nevertheless, its point of view does not always seem to find its way through the twists and 
turns of the collective decision-making process.10 A key explanation for this discrepancy is the 
dissemination of voting rights across various constituencies. As shown in Table 1, most 
European countries do not have a permanent Director, and some of them belong to 
constituencies where the Executive Director is not an EU member. 
Table 1. Representation of EU25 members in the Executive Board (August 26, 2003) 
                                                 
6
 That is: we will investigate the euro area with its composition in the year 2003, etc.   
7
 Each member is endowed with 250 voting rights for every SDR 100,000 quotas. Even for the smallest country in terms of the quota 
(Palau), the fixed part of the voting right is very small (7.5% of Palau’s voting right). 
8
 That is: the 10 new members of May 2004, plus Bulgaria and Romania (who joined in 2007) and Croatia (who joined in 2013). 
9
 Excluding Bulgaria, Romania and Crotia, which roughly adds another 1%.  
10
 See Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry (2001). 
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Single-state EU 
constituencies 
EU elected executive director and EU 
countries in the corresponding 
constituencies. 
EU countries in constituencies with non-EU 
Executive Director 
France Belgium: Austria, Luxembourg, Czech Rep., 
Hungary, Slovak Rep., Slovenia 
Spain (Venezuela) 
Germany Italy: Greece, Portugal, Malta Ireland (Canada) 
United Kingdom Netherlands: Cyprus Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania (Iceland)* 
 Spain Poland (Switzerland) 
* rotating Executive Director. 
Source: www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm 
 
Several scenarios could allow EU members to co-ordinate their views better within the IMF. 
The first one would consist in bringing all EU members into one or several constituencies. A 
single European constituency and a single Executive Director (though preserving the 
representation of each country on the Board of Governors) would allow a reducing the overall 
number of constituencies, from 24 (at present), down to 19 (as set out in the Fund’s Articles). 
But the prominent weight of the EU constituency, which would account for 32% of the quotas 
once the EU enlarges, is unlikely to make this scenario acceptable to third countries. 
Here we explore another scenario which consists in merging EU representations into a single 
seat. In this case, the European Union would have a single representative both on the Board of 
governors and on the Executive Board. Of course, this raises a number of legal problems, as 
IMF members must be States, not groups of States11. Nevertheless, it would be more 
acceptable politically than a single constituency since the EU quota would be adjusted 
downwards, on the ground that the balance of payments of the aggregate member would have 
to be consolidated (thus eliminating current account payments intra-zone). The position of the 
EU in the IMF decision-making process would then be decided by the EU Council of 
Ministers, on the basis of the Nice Treaty. 
However, such a scenario would only be possible in line with further political integration in 
the EU, a prospect that does not gather unanimity. Hence, there is little probability that EU 
members be represented by a single seat in the near future. Conversely, cooperation on IMF-
                                                 
11
 See Mahieu, Ooms and Rottier (2003). 
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competence issues could be engaged on a lower scale within the “enhanced cooperation” 
framework, which allows a sub-group of EU countries to proceed to further cooperation 
provided other EU members stay free to join and are not disadvantaged by the enhanced 
cooperation. 
Hence, three scenarios are considered here and compared to the status quo: 
 an EU25 single seat; 
 an EU15 single seat; 
 an Euro area single seat (as of 2003); 
 a Franco-German single seat. 
The quotas to be attributed to the single European seat in each scenario have been recalculated 
in Bénassy-Quéré and Bowles (2002) under two polar hypothesis: 
(i) the present discrepancy between theoretical quotas (stemming from the five official 
formulas) and the observed quotas (after political negociation) is kept unchanged in 
percentage for the European seat as a whole; 
(ii) the present discrepancy between theoretical and observed quotas is eliminated. 
The results are reported in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Simulated quotas for a single European seat 
As a % of total IMF quotas Quotas in Possible scenarios 
  Sept 2002 Franco-German seat Eurozone seat EU15 seat EU25 seat 
France – Germany 11,2 – 12,2 9,8 – 10,8    
Eurozone 12 23,5 – 28,2 22,1 – 27,0 12,9 – 16,1   
EU15 30,3 – 36,6 29,2 – 35,6 20,9 – 26,0 15,6 – 19,8  
EU25 32,3 – 38,6 31,3 – 37,6 23,2 – 28,3 18,1 – 22,3 15,9 – 20,0 
United States 17,5 – 16,6 17,7-16,9 19,6 – 19,2 20,7 – 20,7 21,2 – 21,3 
Japan 6,3 – 8,3 6,3-8,5 7,0 – 9,7 7,4 – 10,4 7,6 – 10,7 
Developing and transition 
countries 
38,6 – 31,9 39,2-32,5 44,2 – 37,5 47,3 – 40,9 (46,0 – 39,6) 
Note : The first figure is that of observed quotas (first column) or of a situation in which the spread between the 
theoretical and observed quotas is retained. The second figure corresponds to the theoretical quotas resulting 
from a strict application of the Fund’s formulas. For the EU25 seat, new Member states have been removed from 
the « developing and transition countries » group. 
Source : Bénassy-Quéré and Bowles (2002).  
 
3. VOTING POWER  WITH A PRIORI UNIONS  
The notion of power has been extensively investigated in the political sciences litterature, 
which ended up with several and sometimes contradicting definitions. The analysis 
implemented here is based on the concept of voting power, which tries to quantify the power 
of a given player participating in a voting game using a so-called power index. The starting 
point of the analysis is that the amount of voting rights allocated to a given player is not 
enough to get a measure of how much he/she will be able to influence the final outcome. This 
ability, indeed, will also depend on how he/she will be able to engage or even create winning 
coalitions. One can even imagine situation in which a “small” player is able to federate many 
players in a strong coalition, which may then be able to overrule the decision of a “big” 
player. To account for this, the voting power analysis looks at all the possible coalitions that 
can be formed in a given voting game, distinguishing between the winning ones and the 
losing ones. A player would be then said to be “pivotal” whenever his participation is able to 
tranform a losing coalition into a winning one. Overall, the higher the number of coalitions 
where the player is pivotal, the higher his/her voting power will be.  
Formally, the voting power of player i is written: 
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where N is the set of players, pS the probability that the coalition S will form and v a function 
such that v(Si)-v(S)=1 if and only if S is losing and SI is winning. 
Of course, the power thereby defined will depends on the probability distribution chosen.Two 
classical probability measures are generally used, named after the two “founding fathers” of 
the voting power analysis. The Banzhaf probability measure assumes that all coalitions are 
equally probable, independently of their size, that is pS=1/2n-1(Banzhaf, 1965). The Shapley 
probability measure, instead, considers all orderings of players as equally probable, that is 
pS=s!(n-s-1)!/n!, where s and n denotes the cardinality of S and N, respectively (Shapley, 
1954). This latter probability measure is made under the assumption that all players can be 
ranked according to the intensity of their preference over the final outcome (and hence the 
orderings). For each ordering, the “pivotal” player will be the one without which all the 
players with an higher desire to “pass the bill” will be precluded to do so, while all the players 
with a lesser desire will not be needed to make the coalition winning. In other words, the 
Shapley measure reflects the idea that voting committees are always governed by the center. 
Another way to understand the difference of these two probability measures is to see how 
much probability weight they give to non-winning coalitions. In the Banzhaf framework, both 
winning and non-winning coalitions can emerge. For this reason the, the sum of the Banzhaf 
power index of the players does not add up to one, although the results are generaly 
normalized for convenience. In the Shapley framework, only winning coalitions are 
considered. In other words, the former framework sees the coalition formation process as not 
necessarily “efficient”, while the latter framework sees it as “efficient”. In both cases, the 
coalition formation is not modelled and only its result (that is the set of possible coalitions) is 
considered as given. One could always define a probability measure that is more suitable for 
the specific case under consideration, as some coalitions may be more likely than others 
because, say cultural or historical reasons may favour the communication between specific 
groups of players (the conclusion gives some other suggestions that could be followed in 
further research). One interest of the two measures, however, is that they attempt to measure 
the voting power implied by the single structure of the voting game, where the game is solely 
defined by the number of players, their respective voting rights, and the majority threshold. 
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These two indices cannot be directly applied in the case of the IMF, however. Indeed, 
according to the IMF rules, the 184 member states have to meet first in groups of countries, 
the so-called constituencies, in order to elect 25 Executing Directors that will decide over the 
final set of outcomes. In other words, the coalition formation process is restricted. Alonso-
Meijide and Bowles (2005) proposed to use the so-called a priori union framework (Owen, 
1977) in order to take this specificity into account. In this framework, the set of players is 
partitioned into groups of players or “a priori union”, and the set of possible coalition if 
restricted to be compatible with this coalition structure. In other words, whenever a voting 
game takes places, players are constrained to vote by group of players. 
 As for the classical framework, the index will depend on the probability measure used. But 
the introduction of a two level coalition structure makes it possible to choose a specific 
probability distribution for both levels, that is within a given union and between the various 
unions. Four indices can therefore be defined (Owen, 1977, Alonso-Meijide&Fiestras-Janeiro 
2002), Amer, Carreras&Jimenez 2002), which are summarized in the table below: 
Table 3. Probability measures used in the various coalitional power indices under a 
priori union  
 
Probability 
measure used 
 
Banzhaf-Owen 
(BO) 
Symmetric 
Coalitional 
Banzhaf 
(SCB) 
 
Amer-Carreras-
Jimenez 
(ACJ) 
 
Owen 
(OW) 
Between unions Banzhaf Banzhaf Shapley Shapley 
Within unions Banzhaf Shapley Banzhaf Shapley 
 
One interest of the framework is that a change in the coalition structure can change the power 
of a given player without any change in the allocation of voting rights may affect its power, 
just by changing the set of coalitions the players will be allowed to join. 
Following our interpretation in terms of efficiency of the coordination process, each index 
above will provide some information depending on the configuration of the game. For 
instance, if, for some reason, there is a good coordination at the union level but a bad 
coordination between the union, then the symmetric coalition banzhaf may be the more 
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suitable index to look at. In practice, the degree of coordination is not that easy to assess and 
all four indices may be looked at. 
In the following section, the various indices are applied to a set a specific scenario presented 
in section 2. Unfortunately, we were not aware of the existence of the ACJ index when the 
(quite intensive) numerical computation was started, so that only results for the BO, the SCB 
and the OW index are presented below. 
4. THE RESULTS  
We distinguished between the European Constituency and the Single Seat scenario. 
a) the European Consituency scenario 
- Under the 50% majority threshold, the formation of a European Consituency would likely 
increase the power of the EU at the IMF (see Table 4-6).12 The larger the Constituency, the 
larger the power of the EU as a whole. The voting power of the United States, instead, 
decreases. The results are robusts to the three different indices used. 
- The formation of a European Consituency would decrease the power of the EU for the 85% 
majority threshold, however, while the one of the US would increase (see Tables 7-9). In this 
case also, the results seem to be quite robusts to the index used. The decrease of power would 
be quite drastic according to the SCB and the BO index. This reflects one property of the 
Banzhaf type allocation, for which the speed of convergence to the unanimity game (100% 
majority threshold, where all players have the same power) is higher. Intuitively, the higher 
the majority threshold, the closer we are to the one player one vote situation. Reducing the 
number of european players do mechanically reduce the power of EU as a whole, part of this 
lost being allocated to the US. 
  
Tables 4-6. The European Consituency (50% majority threshold) 
Current EU12 EU15 Current EU12 EU15 Current EU12 EU15
Voting power Voting power Voting power
FR+GR 11.00 13.17 14.24 FR+GR 10.44 12.26 15.43 FR+GR 10.44 12.12 15.37
EU12 22.88      27.59 29.92      EU12 21.88      25.75 31.81      EU12 21.88      25.64 32.25      
EU15 29.71      34.24 38.91      EU15 28.38      32.91 41.30      EU15 28.38      32.79 41.86      
EU25 31.88      36.33 40.84      EU25 30.43      35.11 43.36      EU25 30.43      35.02 43.88      
US 20.07      17.89 15.24      US 21.61      13.25 8.20        US 21.60      13.19 8.14        
ScenarioScenario Scenario
 
The numbers presented in the shaded areas are the sum of the power index of the European Consituency and the 
power indices of the remaining european states. 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
Table 7-9. The European Consituency (80% majority threshold) 
                                                 
12
 Only the results for the EU12 and the EU15 are presented there, but the results for the EU25 go in the same direction. 
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 Current EU12 EU15 Current EU12 EU15 Current EU12 EU15
Voting power Voting power Voting power
FR+GR 11.19 11.22 9.31 FR+GR 11.04 2.89 2.58 FR+GR 11.17 1.00 0.44
EU12 23.22      22.97 19.25      EU12 24.09      8.29 7.09        EU12 24.07      2.84 1.14        
EU15 30.19      29.77 25.04      EU15 31.67      17.45 9.15        EU15 31.70      12.55 1.47        
EU25 32.35      31.81 27.18      EU25 34.17      20.67 12.60      EU25 34.12      15.99 5.24        
US 19.71      22.79 25.04      US 6.46        8.00 9.15        US 6.53        8.47 9.98        
ScenarioScenarioScenario
Owen Index 85% Symmetric Coalitional Banzhaf Index 85% Banzhaf-Owen Index 85%
 
The numbers presented in the shaded areas are the sum of the power index of the European Consituency and the 
power indices of the remaining european states. 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
b) The Single EU Seat scenario 
 
The particularity of the Single EU Seat scenario is that the voting rights of the EU are lowered 
by the unification process because of the need to consolidate at the european level the 
economic variables that enters in the computation of the quota, in particular trade and capital 
flows. As discussed in Benassy-Quere and Bowles (2002), these theoretical voting rights, 
however, are just the starting point of a political process after which the final voting rights are 
decided. Two kinds of results are therefore presented below. The first ones rely on the 
theoretical voting rights that the EU should have after the unification (column Th. in the 
various tables, to be compared with the theoretical ones currently prevailing in the column 
current-th). The second rights rely on the “real” voting rights that the EU would have 
assuming that the difference between the theoretical voting rights and the current voting rights 
will be as big as it is now (column Sim., to be compared with the column Current (obs)). 
Two main results can be observed (see Table 10 to 15): 
- the Single EU Seat is likely to unambiguously decrease the power of the EU power for most 
of the scenarios (EU12, EU15 and EU25). The results are convergent for the three voting 
power indices and the two majority requirements (50% and 85%). Conversely, the power of 
the US would increase. This contradicts both Leech (1998) and Bini Smaghi (2005).; 
- the only case where the EU power could increase is the scenario of the franco-german chair; 
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Table 10-12. The Single EU Seat (50% majority threshold) 
Current (obs) Current (th.)
Voting power Th. Sim. Th. Sim. Th. Sim. Th. Sim.
FR+GR 11.00 12.09 11.32 9.49
EU12 22.88           27.78          27.43      24.60      17.26      13.28      
EU15 29.71           36.18          35.87      32.60      20.01      15.35      21.85      16.45      
EU25 31.88           38.06          37.94      34.90      22.27      17.88      24.25      18.87      21.79      16.75      
US 20.07           23.42          19.26      19.06      21.75      22.34      23.42      23.83      23.84      24.77      
Owen Index 50%
EU15 EU25
Scenario
FR+GR EU12
 
The numbers presented in the shaded areas are the sum of the power index of the European Consituency and the 
power indices of the remaining european states.  
Source: author’s calculations 
 
 
Current (obs) Current (th.)
Voting power Th. Sim. Th. Sim. Th. Sim. Th. Sim.
FR+GR 10.44 11.79 10.90 9.06
EU12 21.88           27.26          26.97      23.94      16.00      11.84      
EU15 28.38           35.43          35.35      31.83      18.79      13.89      19.75      14.01      
EU25 30.43           37.32          37.41      34.09      20.99      16.34      22.22      16.57      19.87      14.28      
US 21.61           23.42          19.66      20.00      21.13      23.15      21.48      23.18      22.12      24.11      
Symmetric Coalitional Banzhaf Index 50%
Scenario
FR+GR EU12 EU15 EU25
 
The numbers presented in the shaded areas are the sum of the power index of the European Consituency and the 
power indices of the remaining european states. 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
 
Current (obs) Current (th.)
Voting power Th. Sim. Th. Sim. Th. Sim. Th. Sim.
FR+GR 10.44 11.78 10.89 9.05
EU12 21.88           27.25          26.98      23.95      15.99      11.46      
EU15 28.38           35.43          35.36      31.83      18.78      13.58      19.74      13.97      
EU25 30.43           37.33          37.43      34.10      20.98      16.15      22.21      16.56      19.86      14.31      
US 21.60           23.42          19.65      19.98      21.12      22.41      21.47      23.13      22.11      24.16      
Banzhaf Owen Index 50%
Scenario
FR+GR EU12 EU15 EU25
 
The numbers presented in the shaded areas are the sum of the power index of the European Consituency and the 
power indices of the remaining european states. 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
 
Table 13-15. The Single EU Seat (85% majority threshold) 
Current (obs) Current (th.)
Voting power Th. Sim. Th. Sim. Th. Sim. Th. Sim.
FR+GR 11.19 11.99 12.16 9.89
EU12 23.22           27.32          28.03      24.96      21.51      15.22      
EU15 30.19           35.56          36.29      33.03      24.01      17.34      23.09      21.65      
EU25 32.35           37.45          38.25      35.28      26.03      19.58      25.31      24.11      23.30      21.92      
US 19.71           23.42          20.27      19.79      21.51      20.49      23.09      21.65      23.30      21.92      
Owen Index 85%
FR+GR EU12 EU15 EU25
Scenario
 
The numbers presented in the shaded areas are the sum of the power index of the European Consituency and the 
power indices of the remaining european states. 
Source: author’s calculations 
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Current (obs) Current (th.)
Voting power Th. Sim. Th. Sim. Th. Sim. Th. Sim.
FR+GR 11.04 12.75 8.33 6.95
EU12 24.09           30.61          27.17      23.34      9.44        7.45        
EU15 31.67           39.41          36.95      32.21      13.30      10.26      10.48      8.19        
EU25 34.17           41.61          39.44      34.87      16.44      13.46      14.18      11.96      11.55      8.73        
US 6.46             23.42          8.44        7.09        9.44        7.46        10.48      8.19        11.55      8.73        
Symmetric Coalitional Banzhaf Index 85%
Scenario
FR+GR EU12 EU15 EU25
 
The numbers presented in the shaded areas are the sum of the power index of the European Consituency and the 
power indices of the remaining european states. 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
Current (obs) Current (th.)
Voting power Th. Sim. Th. Sim. Th. Sim. Th. Sim.
FR+GR 11.17 12.99 8.40 7.05
EU12 24.07           30.73          27.04      23.16      9.49        7.21        
EU15 31.70           39.43          36.83      32.14      13.34      10.08      10.52      8.25        
EU25 34.12           41.53          39.26      34.66      16.49      13.28      14.22      12.09      11.60      9.01        
US 6.53             23.42          8.51        7.19        9.49        7.21        10.52      8.25        11.60      9.01        
Banzhaf Owen Index 85%
Scenario
FR+GR EU12 EU15 EU25
 
The numbers presented in the shaded areas are the sum of the power index of the European Consituency and the 
power indices of the remaining european states. 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Overall, the results suggest the unification of EU is likely to reduce its power at the IMF, 
which contradicts previous results. The single scenario which could increase the EU power, 
namely the European Constituency Scenario, is the one who is less likely to emerge, as it is 
based on the assumption that the quota would not be renegotiated after the merger. 
Two remarks should be made regarding these results, however. First, these computations have 
been made using “standard” probability measures, which do not take into account the fact 
countries may tend to collaborate more actively than implied by our assumptions, owing to 
cultural or historical reasons for instance. One way to take this into account could be to 
correct these indices, using for instance the correlation structure of voting rights of the various 
countries at the United Nations for instance, where some more information is available. 
Second, the decrease of power of the EU following some unification process should not be 
considered as the single criteria. It would indeed also have some implications regarding the 
voting power of the other members and may be a way to redistribute some voting powers to 
developing countries 
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